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ABSTRACT 
 
There are two primary configurations of the American state-local relationship. 
The status quo configuration, pure Dillon’s Rule, is a top-down organizational structure 
in which the state, primarily through its legislature, exercises close-to-complete oversight 
over decision-making at the local level – in municipalities, counties, towns, etc. An 
alternative configuration may be brought about by the institution of home rule, a 
constitutionally or legislatively conferred devolution of powers to substate governments 
that allows, at least nominally, for greater autonomy at the local level. This study utilizes 
institutional theory and a systematic review of the current body of literature concerning 
the tangible impacts of differences in state-local power dynamics to comparatively assess 
pure Dillon’s Rule systems and home rule systems of state-local interaction. Through the 
utilization of OneSearch, an aggregate search engine, 518 independent search results 
relevant to the substantive impacts of these systems were gathered from the contemporary 
body of literature. After subjecting these 518 search results to screening based on 
predetermined selection criteria and an even more in-depth critical appraisal process, 60 
sources were ultimately chosen to constitute the study’s literature sample. Eight themes 
were extracted from this literature sample, four of which point to differences between the 
systems in terms of their on-the- ground impacts. Home rule does appear to make 
governing institutions better equipped to respond to local voices and local problems: 
home rule localities’ budgets are more sensitive to emergent community needs, autonomy 
at the local level corresponds to more dramatic shifts in budgetary allocations based on 
electorally expressed wants, and local governments’ legal capacities under home rule do 
allow for a wider range of innovation on social policymaking at the local level. However, 
efficiency gains through home rule are suspect at best; home rule tends to engender more 
bureaucratic sprawl in service delivery, not less, and any local economic gains are more 
or less contingent on that locality being part of a metropolitan area. Thus, this systematic 
review’s results alter the conversation fundamentally, asserting that the question of home 
rule is not properly understood as one of efficiency, but as one of effectiveness in local 
representation.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the late summer of 1980, former California governor Ronald Reagan became 
the first presidential candidate to ever knock upon the door of “Mississippi’s Giant House 
Party,” the famed Neshoba County Fair. There, addressing a sizable crowd from the 
grandstand, Reagan recounted witnessing an Ole Miss triumph on the gridiron against 
Tennessee. He joked in characteristic, anecdotal fashion about the perceived 
incompetence of the federal government’s fiscal management (Congress is like “a fellow 
sitting in a restaurant. He's ordered dinner. He knows he doesn't have any money in his 
pocket to pay for it, but he's hoping maybe he'll find a pearl in his oysters”). And then, in 
a moment that would live on in the nation’s collective political memory long thereafter, 
Reagan turned his attention to the topic of federalism: 
I believe that there are programs…like education and others, that should be turned 
back to the states and the local communities with the tax sources to fund them, 
and let the people [applause drowns out end of statement]. I believe in states’ 
rights; I believe in people doing as much as they can for themselves at the 
community level and at the private level. And I believe that we've distorted the 
balance of our government today by giving powers that were never intended in 
the constitution to that federal establishment. And if I do get the job I'm looking 
for, I'm going to devote myself to trying to reorder those priorities and to restore 
to the states and local communities those functions which properly belong there.1 
 
The exact import of Reagan’s remarks on states’ rights in that address remains a subject 
of contention among political historians, whose thoughts tend to fall in line with one of 
two narratives. Perhaps the on-the-rise presidential candidate, who would go on to win 
the White House and become the pater familias of the “devolution revolution” of the 
                                                
1 “Transcript of Ronald Reagan's 1980 Neshoba County Fair Speech,” Neshoba 
Democrat (Philadelphia, MS): Nov. 15, 2007. 
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1980s, was simply offering an earnest profession of his beliefs about the roles various 
units of governance ought to play in the American political system. Or perhaps, speaking 
in a county that was infamous for having been a hotbed of racial strife and violence 
during the Civil Rights Movement, Reagan’s mere mention of the issue at all – and the 
use of the phrase “states’ rights” as an encapsulation of his beliefs in particular – ought to 
be understood as part of a larger ploy to continue the work of Nixon’s Southern Strategy, 
stoking the racial animus of many white Southern voters of the time as a means of 
criticizing the intervention of the federal government more broadly and thereby seeking 
to erode support for the Democratic Party in the once-solid South.2  
Whether the former or the latter account is more accurate, there is certainly one 
central element at work in this historical moment that is not in dispute: the position that 
states ought to maintain a relative degree of autonomy in tending to affairs within their 
respective borders is one that, then, as now, was well received in the South. Indeed, 
decentralization of power has been a definitive plank of the Southern platform in national 
politics since at least the time of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.  
Why is it, then, that the popularity of devolution down south seems to stall out 
past the federal-state relationship? In Alabama, the proverbial “Heart of Dixie,” there 
have been calls “before and during every legislative session in recent memory,” to allow 
local governments – municipalities, counties, etc. – greater control over their own affairs 
                                                
2 For an in-depth discussion of the context and the historical and political 
ramifications of Ronald Reagan’s Neshoba County Fair speech, please see:  
 
David L. Chappell et al., Ronald Reagan's Neshoba County Speech, Video, presented by 
the Organization of American Historians (2010; Washington: CSPAN, 2010.), Web. 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?293124-1/ronald-reagans-neshoba-county-speech 
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than exists in the status quo, but “despite the media attention that has been focused on 
this issue, it never reaches serious agenda status in the Alabama Legislature.”3 Similarly, 
in Mississippi, despite the passage of a 1985 law conferring greater authority to 
municipal governments, “cities have been reluctant to use the power granted them,” and 
have instead continued to request local and private legislation to approve of actions that 
they undertake, rendering any devolution of authority achieved through the act nominal at 
best.4 
Increasingly, this is an inconsistency played out not just in the South, but 
nationally. A 2014 report published by the Cato Institute concludes, based on a 
compilation of recent polling regarding division-of-powers issues, that “Americans 
generally have shifted in favor of a more devolved federalism,” being, on the whole, 
“more supportive of decentralized policymaking on many issues where they previously 
supported a stronger national role.”5 Gallup polling also originating in 2014 corroborates 
this shift, revealing that even in the midst of historic declines in popular trust of the 
American central government,6 “Americans’ trust in state and local governing institutions 
maintained their respective confidence levels,” with Americans “continu[ing] to trust 
their local governments (72%) more than their state governments (62%).”7  
                                                
3 Douglas J. Watson, “Home Rule in Alabama and in the South,” Alabama State 
University Center for Leadership and Public Policy: Alabama Issues Series (2013): 1. 
4 Ibid., 18. 
5 John Samples and Emily Ekins, “Public Attitudes toward Federalism: The 
Public’s Preference for Renewed Federalism,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis, no. 759 
(2014): 3; 1. 
6 Jeffrey M. Jones, “Trust in Federal Gov't on International Issues at New Low,” 
Gallup.com, last modified September 10, 2014. 
7 Justin McCarthy, “Americans Still Trust Local Government More Than State,” 
Gallup.com, last modified September 22, 2014. 
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Yet, for the moment, the state-local relationship – which can lay claim to no 
Constitutional enumerations or reservations of powers that might serve as a guiding light 
– remains haphazardly defined in most states, and where defined with clarity, the 
relationship is decidedly state-dominant. This is because the most nationally relevant 
legal decree concerning the nature of state and local government interaction is an 1868 
opinion penned by Iowa Supreme Court Justice John Forrest Dillon (then one of the 
nation’s most preeminent scholars of municipal law), which asserts that “Municipal 
corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the 
legislature…As it creates, so may it destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and 
control."8   
Dillon’s Rule, or the Dillon Rule, as the logic advanced by this pronouncement 
has come to be known, quickly rose to prominence in the American legal system, 
becoming, in short order, the final word concerning disputes of authority between state 
and local units of governance. However, not fully a decade into the existence of Dillon’s 
Rule, a countervailing development was made: local home rule conferred through either 
the passage of state constitutional provisions or legislative enactment – which 
undermines state centrism while nonetheless working within the conception of the state-
local relationship advanced by Dillon.  
At present, several states have passed some form of municipal and/or county 
home rule-enabling constitutional provision or general legislative enactment, and where 
such actions have not been taken, home rule is often seen by at least some policy actors 
as, if not a panacea, certainly a viable means of improving on the status quo of state and 
                                                
8 Clinton v Cedar Rapids and the Missouri River Railroad, (24 Iowa 455; 1868). 
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local governance in multiple respects. For example, the Alabama Policy Institute, an 
influential voice in Montgomery, has advocated for what it calls a “uniform system of 
limited home rule” since the early 2010s not solely on the basis of perceived potential 
benefits in service delivery and accountability, but also on the basis of a state-specific 
concern: Alabama’s notoriously long and confounding state constitution, which is all the 
longer for the 35,000 local acts it contains.9   
 As it happens, recent efforts to usher home rule into existence in state-local 
relationships that were previously state-dominant have been met, where enacted, with 
considerable favor by the citizenry and by officials at both levels of government.10 It is 
the opinion of the author of this research effort that this fact, along with the increasingly 
pro-devolutionary deportment of the American public and persistent political pressure in 
many state-centric systems to make a fundamental change in the state-local relationship, 
urges forth a new discussion about the substantive differences between state-local 
relationships governed purely by Dillon’s Rule and those in which municipal home rule 
brings about more parity of authority. By “substantive” is meant “tangible.” What extant 
theory presumes about the differences between these systems is fairly clear and serves as 
a useful means of framing observations. An infinitely more engaging question is this: 
what salient information might be culled from approximately 150 years of actual, on-the-
ground experience with both types of state-local relationships? 
 In order to engage this question in a meaningful way, the research presented 
herein utilizes institutional theory and a systematic review of the current body of 
                                                
9 “Home Rule in Alabama,” API Guide to the Issues (2012): 1-2. 
10 “West Virginia Code §8-1-5a. Municipal Home Rule Pilot Program,” West 
Virginia Legislature, accessed May 2, 2016, http://www.legis.state.wv.us/wvcode/ 
ChapterEntire.cfm?chap=08&art=1&section=5A. 
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literature concerning the tangible impacts of differences in state-local power dynamics to 
comparatively assess pure Dillon’s Rule systems and home rule systems of state-local 
interaction. 
 The following chapter, Chapter 2, will lay bare the theory of institutionalism in 
which this study is couched with a discussion of its history, its general means of 
application in scholarly research, and its aptness for exploring the subject at-hand. 
Chapter 2 will also probe that subject at-hand by offering an in-depth look into the 
formation and development of both Dillon’s Law and municipal home rule and by 
defining a few terms and concepts crucial to the state-local relationship. Chapter 3 will 
explain in detail the methodology of the systematic review process employed by this 
study. In Chapter 4, the results of that systematic review will be presented, and discussion 
in Chapter 5 will place the results in a broader context, merging theoretical expectations 
with the study’s empirical observations to engender new connections, insights, and 
conclusions. 
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Chapter 2: Preliminary Literature Review 
 
I. Institutional Theory 
 
 Where theories of management and organization are concerned, few have proven 
to be more impactful and more interdisciplinary in their scholarly reach than that of 
institutionalism, or institutional theory. This is because, more than any other of the 
prominently featured entries in the catalogue of organizational theory, institutionalism 
offers an integrative, holistic approach to thinking about (1) why organizations are and 
(2) why they are the way that they are. Resource dependency theory, agency theory, and a 
host of other common theories focus almost exclusively on internal processes, and in 
most cases, only focus on internal processes from a single perspective; each has 
important contributions to make to our collective understanding of organizations’ 
formation and development, but ultimately, the most these narrowly focused theories can 
hope to do is illuminate the contours of the cogs at work in the organizational machine.  
Institutionalism, on the other hand, carried to its logical terminus, leaves the 
thorough and thoughtful researcher with a diagram explaining not only how these cogs fit 
together, but also how the machine they make tick interacts with its operating 
environment and vice-versa. Institutional theory, that is to say, is a multifaceted model of 
systemic organization, one that is inherently cognizant of and sensitive to the external as 
well as the internal forces that shape organizational character, processes, and culture. In 
this regard, early developments in open systems theory can be counted among 
institutionalism’s principal forebears – and in order to properly explore that connection, 
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one must look to organizational theory as it existed in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. 
A. The Historical Roots of Institutional Theory 
 
 At the turn of the 19th century to the 20th, German scholar Max Weber became to 
the bourgeoning, intertwined fields of organizational and managerial theory what John 
Maynard Keynes would soon become to economics – the only substantive barrier to the 
analogy being that economics had existed for centuries prior to Keynes’s arrival at the 
forefront, whereas “recognition of management as an identifiable function – in any 
organizational setting – is relatively recent in the scope of history.”11 In fact, a paper by 
Henry Towne that some point to as the point of origin of management “as an independent 
field of study with its own literature” was written in the year 1886, and America’s first 
school of management was founded two years later in 1888.12 Regardless, in the early 
1900s, Weber’s scholarship, unique in its prescriptiveness at the time, ascended to 
hegemonic status in these newly probed corners of academia. His principal contribution 
to these fields was the advancement of a vision of bureaucracy as an ideal model of 
organizational and managerial relationships, through which he “sought to replace 
authority based on tradition and charisma with legal authority and to prescribe an 
impersonal and merit basis for selecting, hiring, and promoting employees.”13 The six 
principal characteristics of the Weberian theory of bureaucratic management are (1) clear 
                                                
11 Michael J. Worth. Nonprofit Management: Principles and Practices, Second 
Edition (Los Angeles: Sage, 2012), 8. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Daniel A. Wren and Arthur G. Bedeian, The Evolution of Management 
Thought, Sixth Edition (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons, 2009), 234. 
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divisions of work and authority, (2) a rigid hierarchy of positions, (3) written guidelines 
prescribing performance criteria, (4) specialization and expertise as the bases of 
recruitment/advancement, (5) career office-holding, and (6) insuring that a person’s 
duties and authority are prescribed by his or her office alone.14 As Worth recounts, Weber 
was of the opinion that bureaucracy’s definitional focus on “rules and a formal hierarchy 
of positions” ought to be particularly suited to the achievement of efficiency and 
effectiveness.15 For several ensuing decades, Weber’s wisdom was paramount, with 
contemporary researchers frequently devoting their efforts to the furtherance of the 
concepts of Weberian bureaucracy.16  
To be sure, in the world that Weber inhabited, one in which the basic functioning 
of status quo administrative systems was perpetually marred by “personal subjugation 
and cruelty, as well as…capricious and subjective judgments,” a “decidedly unjust” 
world “dominated by class consciousness and nepotism,” his model of the bureaucratic 
ideal – a direct reaction to these perverse realities – was a remarkably preferable 
alternative in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness, to say absolutely nothing of 
equity concerns.17 In this context, the concept’s meteoric rise to acceptance among early 
scholars with a managerial/organizational focus is hardly cause for puzzlement. Its 
longstanding hegemony, in turn, explains Weber’s continued influence on organizational 
and managerial theory; the vestiges of his theoretical perspectives are alive and well in 
the literature to this day – and it is of particular significance, given the topic at-hand, that 
                                                
14 David Jaffee, Organization Theory: Tension and Change (Boston: McGraw 
Hill, 2001), 90.  
15 Worth, Nonprofit Management, 58.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Wren and Bedeian, Evolution of Management, 229. 
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among these vestiges is a continued focus on formally structuring power and task-
completion relationships among distinct organizational components.  
However, in the present day, there is, undeniably, a foundational disconnect with  
Weber’s bureaucratic prescriptions18 – to the extent that Wren and Bedeian feel 
compelled to reiterate that “Weber did not use the term bureaucracy in the disparaging, 
emotionally tinged sense of red tape, endless lines, and rule-encumbered inefficiency,” 
but “as a noncritical label referring to what he regarded as the most modern and efficient 
method of organizing yet developed.”19 While the causality of popular sentiments, 
whereby bureaucracy became a term “tinged” in these ways, is difficult to prove 
definitively, it is certain that, with the passage of time and the accrual of new 
information, experiential and otherwise, organizational and managerial scholarship began 
to turn a critical eye to the monolith of Weberian bureaucracy and charted a new course 
in society’s understanding of what an organization is and how one can – and should – 
operate. Weber’s scholarship, while revolutionary, was certainly not immune to criticism. 
In his intentness to resolve issues of nepotism and bias that hampered important 
institutions in his day, Weber took an approach to theory that was stringently focused on 
                                                
18 Before departing from the subject of Weber’s work, it is worth mentioning that 
some scholars of organizational/managerial theory have asserted that characterizing 
Weber’s work on bureaucracy as prescriptive is a mistranslation – figuratively and 
perhaps even literally. For an in-depth assertion of this position, see: 
 
Richard M. Weiss, “Weber on Bureaucracy: Management Consultant or Political 
Theorist?,” The Academy of Management Review 8, no. 2 (1983): 242-248. 
 
Regardless, as the above article freely admits, the common perception of Weber’s 
scholarship has been (and, in large part, continues to be) that it is prescriptive, making the 
point, while worthy of note, essentially moot. 
19 Wren and Bedeian, Evolution of Management, 229. 
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organizations’ internal dynamics, and this was a trait that was carried on in the research 
of many who followed him.  
In the mid-20th century, a new wave of scholarship began, prominently advanced 
by Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn in the 1966 text The Social Psychology of 
Organizations, that sought to resolve this deficiency by looking beyond the organization 
to perceive of influencing factors in the organization’s external environment, as well.20 
This was the dawn of open systems thinking in the context of the organization, and as 
Katz explains, writing retrospectively, this brave new world in organizational theory 
came about as a reconciliation of the “micro approach of the psychologist” with the 
“macro account of the sociologist”:  
Though most of our lives are spent within the confines of organizations…few 
social psychological approaches go beyond the family or the small informal 
group. On the other hand, the conventional accounts of sociologists or economists 
tend to leave out people in their explanations of social structure. Between the 
micro approach of the psychologist and the macro account of the sociologist there 
is a need for a bridge to interrelate the concepts of the two levels. Our book was 
an attempt to apply such a bridge through the framework of open system 
theory…Specifically, open system theory suggested two important lines of attack. 
One derived from the notion of systems and suggested that the problems of 
organizations could be viewed as a function of the type of structuring in which 
they occurred…the second line of attack is the search for social dynamics in the 
interdependence of organization and environment as the organization relies upon 
energic and informational input from its surround and processes this input to 
achieve a product which the larger society needs. Organizations are not self-
contained, though they seek to control their environs and extend their 
boundaries.21 
 
Thus, just as no man is an island, no organization instituted among men is, either. 
Furthermore, in another similarity with their human progenitors, organizations are, in a 
way, organic: agents of change as well as the changed in their interactions with their 
                                                
20 Worth, Nonprofit Management, 58. 
21 Daniel Katz, “This Week’s Citation Classic (Number 29),” Current Contents 
July (1980): 242. 
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respective environs. And in this back-and-forth exchange, there is adaption, as well. “The 
simplest system,” Worth summarizes, “includes inputs, a transformative process 
that…changes or manipulates [the inputs] in some way…and the outputs resulting from 
that process. Systems also include feedback loops…to learn and alter…behavior 
accordingly.”22  
B. Traditional Approaches to Institutional Theory 
 
To say that recognizing organizations as adaptive, systemic wholes with 
multifaceted external contexts represented a major shift in the literature would almost be 
an understatement, and concurrently with and subsequently to this revolution in thought, 
the seeds of institutional theory were sown and nourished. Interestingly, even in this 
primordial stage of institutionalism, one can already begin to see its suitability as a frame 
for analyzing the issue of substate home rule taking shape, as it was conceived of in an 
academic environment that contended “that the problems of organizations could be 
viewed as a function of the type of structuring in which they occurred” and that had 
eschewed past theories that “accepted the existing structures as givens and did not deal 
adequately with problems of restructuring or social change.”23 
At its core, institutional theory rests on the intuitive but nonetheless profound 
observation that those elements of a society’s ordering that are so thoroughly embedded 
within the social whole as to be “institutionalized” are of profound importance, 
demarcating, among other things, the boundaries, expectations, and the negative and 
positive rights of organizational behavior – and as a corollary to this observation, the 
                                                
22 Worth, Nonprofit Management, 58. 
23 Daniel Katz, “This Week’s Citation Classic, 242. 
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process of institutionalization itself is also worthy of scholarly consideration when 
analyzing an organization’s structure and behavior. Polski and Ostrom summarize 
institutionalism’s driving force perfectly, declaring that “Institutions are everywhere, 
governing our lives in fundamental ways”; the implication, of course, is that those who 
would engage in scholarly analysis of a situation without properly pondering the 
institutionalized forces at play do so at the peril of their research’s accuracy.24 
But what exactly is an institution, and how does this term, so often synonymous 
with “organization” in colloquial usage, differ from that which it affects? Again Polski 
and Ostrom’s descriptions are instructive and are archetypal within the wider body of 
institutional theory. An institution is “a widely understood rule, norm, or strategy that 
creates incentives for behavior in repetitive situations…that [require] coordination among 
two or more individuals or groups of individuals.” These entities can arise formally (“in 
the form of a law, policy, or procedure”) or informally (“as norms, standard operating 
practices, or habits”) and may arise singularly or, as is more often the case, “in a set of 
related arrangements.”25 An organization, meanwhile, is properly defined within 
institutional theory as “a set of institutional arrangements and participants who have a 
common set of goals and purposes, and who must interact across multiple action 
situations at different levels of activity”; they are “the product of human effort to order 
relations by removing uncertainty in repetitive interactions.”26 
One of the most influential takeaways from institutional theory generally has been 
the development of the concept of isomorphism, a notion that holds that there is a 
                                                
24 Margaret M. Polski and Elinor Ostrom, “An Institutional Framework for Policy 
Analysis and Design” (1999), 2. 
25 Ibid., 3-4. 
26 Ibid., 4.  
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palpable “tendency for organizations in the same field to become more like each other as 
a result of facing similar influences from their environments.”27 And interestingly, one 
can, in a sense, see this concept at work in the development of the theory itself. Over the 
roughly six decades since its inception, institutionalism has progressed from a web of 
similar, interconnected, but substantially differentiated theoretical interpretations to a 
much more extensively unified perspective. 
Writing in the late 1980s, a period he deemed to mark the “adolescence” of 
institutional theory (“a phase of more deliberate development, accompanied by efforts 
aimed at self-assessment and consolidation”), W. Richard Scott, a prominent sociologist 
and advocate of institutionalism, remarks that “the beginning of wisdom in approaching 
institutional theory is to recognize at the outset that there is not one but several 
variants…Although there seems to be an underlying similarity in the various approaches, 
there is little agreement on specifics.”28 Scott goes on to identify and describe “four 
sociological formulations all claiming an institutional focus” – in essence, the four 
dominant traditions within the theory at its coming-of-age: 
1. Institutionalization As a Process of Instilling Value – Advanced by Philip Selznick and 
those he instructed, this early strain of institutional theory perceives of organizational 
structure “as an adaptive vehicle shaped in reaction to the characteristics and 
commitments of participants as well as to influences and constraints from the external 
environment” – and perceives of institutionalism as the process of organizational 
                                                
27 Worth, Nonprofit Management, 62. 
28 W. Richard Scott, “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly 32, no. 4 (1987): 493   
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adaptation.29 The institutionalism process is seen as a gradual occurrence that is “subject 
to conscious design and intervention” and in which contextualizing elements such as an 
individual organization’s history are of great significance. Processes that are 
institutionalized are said to derive their value, at least in part, from the “nesting of these 
processes into the [organizational] whole.”30 
2. Institutionalization As a Process of Creating Reality – Berger, Luckmann, and Zucker 
have been among the leading voices of this school of thought regarding 
institutionalization, a process that they contend “occurs whenever there is a reciprocal 
typification of habitualized actions by types of actors.”31 That actors are typified as well 
as actions, such that “certain forms of actions come to be associated with certain classes 
of actors; e.g., supervisors give orders, workers follow them” is an important point of 
departure from Selznick’s work. Indeed, this strain of institutionalism arguably concerns 
itself more substantially than any other with determining the precise process by which 
man conceives of institutions and his role amidst them. According to Berger and 
Luckmann, the whole of institutionalism can be fleshed out in three phases, which they 
call “moments”: “We and our associates take action (externalization), but we together 
interpret our actions as having an external reality separate from ourselves (objectivation); 
further, the objectivated world is internalized by us, coming to “determine the subjective 
structures of consciousness itself (internalization).”32 It follows that, as Zucker later 
wrote, “lnstitutionalized acts…must be perceived as both objective and exterior,”33 as 
                                                
29 Ibid., 494. 
30 qtd. in Ibid. 
31 qtd. in Ibid., 495. 
32 qtd. in Ibid., 495. 
33 qtd. in Ibid., 496. 
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basic truths of social ordering that are no longer merely manmade constructs. Thus, this 
strain of institutional theory was instrumental in the creation of isomorphism, with its 
assertion that “institutionalization is rooted in conformity… operat[ing] to produce 
common understandings about what is appropriate and, fundamentally, meaningful 
behavior.”34 
3. Institutional Systems As a Class of Elements – A truly remarkable turning point in the 
development of institutional theory, this perspective has its roots in the writings of John 
Meyer. Though Meyer’s first prominent contribution to the literature of institutionalism 
was a widely celebrated article in the institutionalization-as-creating-reality vein, he 
gradually developed an independent and competing conceptualization of the theory that 
was remarkably differentiated from the two aforementioned approaches. Rather than 
positing that institutionalism is a process that can simply be deliberately undertaken by an 
organization and effected for just any sort of trait, structure, or behavior for which 
permanence is desired, Meyer envisions institutional systems as being “a distinctive class 
of elements that can account for the existence and/or the elaboration of organizational 
structure.” Furthermore, Meyer states that the elements comprising this class are derived 
not from any single source, but rather from “a variety of…loci of ‘rationalized and 
impersonal prescriptions that identify various social purposes’ and ‘specify in a rulelike 
way the appropriate means’ to pursue them.”35 Thus, in this conceptualization, there is no 
definitive path to institutionalism, nor is there one particular source of received wisdom 
regarding organizational structure and behavior that is paramount. As a result, this 
                                                
34 qtd. in Ibid., 497. 
35 Ibid. 
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perspective suggests a major change in how organizational/managerial theory scholars 
think about an organizations environment. Scott notes: 
In contrast to the prevailing theories of organizational environments…that call 
attention primarily to technical requirements, resource streams, information flows, 
and influence relations, the new formulation  stresses the role played by cultural 
elements – symbols cognitive systems, normative beliefs – and the sources of 
such elements.36 
 
Furthermore, because there is no end-all, be-all font of institutionalism, “Organizations 
do not necessarily conform to a set of institutionalized beliefs because 
they ‘constitute reality’ or are taken for granted;” instead, they are understood as being 
incentivized to conform in order to attain the benefits of “increased legitimacy, 
resources, and survival capabilities” that arise from acting with requisite respect for 
external cultural pressures.37 Lastly, because it is a perspective cognizant of the multiple 
sources of “rational myths” in a society, analysis conducted in this strain of 
institutionalism is particularly attuned to types of actors that were previously 
insufficiently considered, actors “such as the state…that shape organizational life both 
directly by imposing constraints and requirements and indirectly by creating and 
promulgating new rational myths.” 38  
4. Institutions As Distinct Societal Spheres – This final tradition of thought within 
institutional theory is intriguing in that it builds upon the operative assumptions of the 
class-of-elements perspective by linking them to proto-institutionalism sociological 
literature. Friedland and Alford, this perception’s key proponents, borrow from that early 
20th century scholarship “the structural-functional assumption,” relatively underutilized in 
                                                
36 Ibid., 497-498. 
37 Ibid., 498. 
38 Ibid., 499. 
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institutional theory until their efforts, “that basic needs or survival requisites [are] set and 
that the differentiation of institutional spheres constitute[s] an adaptive societal response 
to these requirements.”39 In other words, not only are there multiple sources of 
institutionalized elements that bring to bear different structural and behavioral outcomes 
on different kinds of organizations, but also, this multiplicity of structural and behavioral 
outcomes is desirable from the standpoint of organizational adaptation and stems directly 
from that fact. Yet, there’s more still to this perspective, given that it holds that “Any 
given activity – the carrying on of productive work, the attempt to govern – can have 
multiple meanings and can be the focus of conflicting and contradictory definitions and 
demands.”40 In bridging this gray area, scholars of the distinct-societal-spheres tradition 
tend to emphasize “substantive content,”41 by which they mean the essential, tangible 
objectives of the particular organizations being considered. 
Developments within institutional theory from the 1990s onward have been 
especially geared toward the formal introduction and application of institutional analysis 
to a number of humanities disciplines theretofore somewhat isolated from institutional 
theory’s reach. Most notably, this has invigorated a renewed fusion of political and 
economic studies known variously as political economy studies, public choice theory, 
and institutional economics.42 Working in close conjunction with scholarship in other 
fields, institutional theory has found cause not only to unleash its exceptional power to 
integrate perspectives from multiple disciplines, but also to turn its integrative efforts  
                                                
39 Ibid., 500 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Polski and Ostrom, “An Institutional Framework for Policy Analysis and 
Design,” 2-3. 
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inward, condensing its four somewhat disparate traditional interpretations into a more  
unified and coherent whole. 
 Undoubtedly, one of the more impressive and tangible achievements in this regard 
to-date has been the creation of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework, which is “the collective product of the many and diverse social scientists who 
have participated in the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis over…25 
years.”43 The IAD’s uses are threefold. First and foremost, it is a research method that 
crystallizes institutional analysis as a definite series of steps. Secondly, through the work 
of Polski and Ostrom, the framework has been fine-tuned for use “as a tool for policy 
analysts who are evaluating policy effectiveness, initiating policy reform,  
or designing new policy interventions.”44 Lastly, given these first two roles, the IAD’s 
structure implicitly conveys much about how the various factors that have an impact on 
institutionalism fit together. In so doing, it is, further still, an interesting means of 
synthesizing the four major traditions of institutional theory. As can be observed in 
Figure 2-1, the IAD conceives of institutionalism as an adaptive influence on 
organizational structure and behavior that is shaped by primary inputs emanating from 
the external environment (Institutionalism As a Process of Instilling Value), with a 
particular emphasis on communal and cultural factors (Institutional Systems As a Class 
of Elements), that affect the particular characteristics of the action area (Institutions As 
Distinct Societal Spheres) to produce habitualized patterns of interactions 
(Institutionalization As a Process of Creating Reality).  
                                                
43 Ibid., 2. 
44 Ibid. 
Figure 2-1 Source: Polski and Ostrom 
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Given the topic at-hand in this thesis, which is ultimately a question of altering 
rules-in-use, it is important to note that Polski and Ostrom have granted especial focus to 
this element of the framework: 
Rules are frequently nested in other sets of rules that define how lower-level rules 
function. Whenever we address questions about policy change, we must 
distinguish three levels of rules that cumulatively affect the actions taken and 
outcomes obtained…Operating rules affect participants’ day-to-day decision 
making in specific political and economic settings…Collective-choice rules 
determine who is eligible to participate in activity affecting the operating level 
and how operating rules may be changed…constitutional rules determine who is 
eligible to participate in crafting collective-choice rules and how these rules may 
be changed.45  
 
The order of this nesting of rules-in-use according to Polski and Ostrom is illustrated 
above in Figure 2-2; constitutional rules set forth the boundaries of collective-choice 
rulemaking, while collective-choice rules set forth the boundaries of operating rules. 
  
 
                                                
45 Ibid., 19. 
Figure 2-2Source: Polski and Ostrom 
Figure 2-1  Source: Polski and Ostrom, 1999 
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II. Home Rule in America 
To couch the subject matter of this study in terms relevant to contemporary issues, 
given lagging the lagging economic growth faced in many corners of America, planning 
scholars Blakely and Leigh, in their text Planning Local Economic Development: Theory 
and Practice, assert that, in spite of the inexorable presence of factors beyond their 
powers to control, local governing institutions in the United States must take on an active 
role in the process of promoting economic development within their respective borders – 
that such activity is beneficial and, indeed, of the essence for success in the midst of 
today’s vast and ever-changing economic landscape:      
…localities cannot control what happens in the global economic system, and 
neither can their state government, or even the federal government. However, this 
does not mean that local economies must simply be victims of unknown forces. 
Communities need to learn about the external economic forces shaping them and 
work to position themselves to take advantage of opportunities and avoid threats 
from outside their reach. They must be entrepreneurial in seizing opportunities, 
Figure 2-2  Source: Polski and Ostrom, 1999 
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cutting losses, investing in strategic programs, and leveraging their assets to 
compete in the new economy.46 
 
However, in much of America, the matter of whether or not localities have been invested 
with the rights and powers essential to their capacity to fulfill Blakely and Leigh’s charge 
remains open to debate, as does the equally fundamental question of whether or not local 
control on this order should be a goal of policy in the first place. Not an unsubstantial 
number of local leaders have contended that their capacity to effect positive change at the 
communal scale is hindered systematically by entities far more concrete and substantive 
than mindset; as Richardson, Gough, and Puentes observe, many local policy leaders 
have sought to “look to their state governments for relief,”47 “contend[ing] they are 
handcuffed by…strict interpretation of state laws” and “often yearn[ing] for greater 
‘home rule’ authority.”48  
This object of their yearning, home rule, is a highly important feature of the 
modern landscape of community-level governance in the United States and possesses a 
rich history extending back to establishment of the American central government. 
However, it is not an easy thing to encapsulate on paper. “Any discussion of ‘Home 
Rule’ should begin with a definition of the phrase,” Ice asserts at the beginning of an 
article on municipal home rule in Indiana, only to immediately concede that “The balance 
                                                
46 Edward J. Blakely and Nancey Green Leigh, Planning Local Economic 
Development: Theory and Practice (Los Angeles: Sage, 2010), 66. 
47 Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Meghan Zimmerman Gough, and Robert Puentes, “Is 
Home Rule the Answer?: Clarifying the Influence of Dillon’s Rule on Growth 
Management” (a discussion paper prepared for the Brookings Institution Center on Urban 
and Metropolitan Policy, Washington, D.C., 2003), vii. 
48 Ibid. 
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of this Article could be consumed with that subject.”49 Indeed, there is not only great 
complexity, but also great confusion involved in discussion of the concept. In 1954, the 
Chicago Home Rule Commission submitted that “there is perhaps no term in the 
literature of political science or law which is more susceptible to misconception and 
variety of meaning than ‘home rule,’”50 and for myriad reasons, this remains the case 
today, some 60-odd years later. These reasons will be laid bare in detail in the literature 
review to come. For now, home rule is best understood in the most inclusive manner 
possible. It is, at its essence, “the devolution of state power to local governments” – put a 
bit more precisely, it is the means whereby state-to-local devolutions of power are 
brought into effect, “a state constitutional provision or legislative action that provides a 
city or county government with a greater measure of self-government.”51 Intertwined 
with and carried forth by the concrete entity of home rule is a more abstract and 
fundamental aim that Krane, Rigos, and Hill identify as the “ideal” of home rule, “the 
ability of a local government to act and make policy in all areas that have not been 
designated to be of statewide interest…”52 
Currently, although observations regarding the presence or absence of home rule 
in each state tend to vary, home rule authority is available to municipalities in a majority 
of states, and in several of the state policy regimes in which it exists, the concept has 
extended beyond its traditional scope of existence to apply to entities like county 
                                                
49 Harry T. Ice, “Municipal Home Rule in Indiana,” Indiana Law Journal 17, no. 
5 (1948): 375. 
50 Chicago Home Rule Commission, “Modernizing a City Government” (local 
government commission report, Chicago, IL, 1954), n pag. 
51 Richardson et al., “Is Home Rule the Answer?,” 10. 
52 Dale Krane, Platon N. Rigos, and Melvin Hill, Home Rule in America: A Fifty-
State Handbook (Washington: CQ Press, 2001), 2. 
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governments, as well.53 This superficial glance at home rule’s geographical spread, 
however, fails to adequately account for factors that might mitigate the reality of home 
rule where it nominally exists . 
At a fundamental level, the history of American policycraft might best be 
understood as a narrative of the efforts of countless citizens and citizen-statesmen alike to 
make sense of one particularly cumbersome question: namely, what a government 
invested with authority and power through the express consent of the governed really 
ought to look like in practice. Imbedded within this inquiry are those critical, definitional 
aspects of a political system’s existence famously crystallized by Lasswell: who gets 
what, when, and how. And as specifically concerns the “how” of governance in America, 
perhaps no one concept has played a more significant role than that of federalism, “the 
theory or advocacy of federal principles for dividing powers between member units and 
common institutions.”54 Indeed, even now, many of the domestic programs and issues 
that consume the attention of the nation’s political press and the dockets of its highest 
courts – from the Affordable Care Act to the Common Core State Standards Initiative to 
disputes over the legality of same-sex marriage – involve, whether directly or indirectly, 
specific, normative ideas about how the power transmitted by American citizens to their 
system of government might best be distributed among the institutions comprising that 
system. 
                                                
53 Stephanie Cole and Samuel K. Gove, “Home Rule in Illinois: Final Report, 
Background Papers, and Speeches” (report on proceedings of the Assembly on Home 
Rule in Illinois, Lake Bluff, IL, 1973), 17.  
54 “Federalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, March 4, 2014. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/federalism/ 
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The research effort presented herein can be seen as situating itself within this 
ongoing conversation about scalar divisions of power in America’s system of 
governance. More precisely, it seeks to investigate and elucidate the particulars of an 
aspect of these scalar divisions that is markedly underserved in the current body of 
literature on the subject: the structural power relationships between state and local 
governments.  
In the midst of decades, indeed centuries, of high-profile struggles for power and 
authority between the American federal government and state governments, 
considerations of the proper structure of states’ relationships with the localities contained 
within them have not loomed especially large in the national consciousness. In its seminal 
report “Local Government Autonomy: Needs for State Constitutional Statutory, and 
Judicial Clarification,” the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
(ACIR) notes that “Experience with local government, which is shared by all Americans, 
has rarely given rise to sustained and systematic reflection about the relationship between 
local government and the state,” but cautions against the continuation of this reality, 
asserting that “no account of American federalism that omits the dynamic interplay of 
local governments with the federal and state governments does justice either to historical 
experience or contemporary practice.”55 To the Commission’s point, just as notions of 
American federalism at the national level have evolved through the succession of decades 
and through exposure to new challenges of governance, so, too, have the legal parameters 
defining states’ interactions with more localized governing institutions undergone 
                                                
55 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental  Relations, “Local 
Government Autonomy: Needs for State Constitutional Statutory, and Judicial 
Clarification” (public report of the ACIR, Washington, DC, 1993), 7. 
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considerable transformation, and the public policy implications of this transformative 
process demand scholarly attention and analysis. 
It has been widely remarked that changes in the federal government’s division-of-
powers relationship with state governments in the past century have, on the whole, made 
manifest a shift from a regimented system of dual federalism to a new American take on 
the system that values inter-scalar cooperation and has enabled the central government of 
the United States to play a more active role in the lives of its citizens. Thus, it perhaps 
seems counterintuitive to observe that a strong undercurrent of regionalism and local 
autonomy has long made itself apparent in the developments of state-local relations, both 
prior to and contemporaneous with these federal-state developments. That observation, 
though, is no less than fundamental to ascertaining a sense of states’ and localities’ 
progressions in thought over the course of more than a century about the powers that 
ought to be afforded to each in accordance with their scalar differences.  
A. Defining Key Terms: Local Government Autonomy 
 
Before delving into the past or present details of the American state-local 
relationship, it is, of course, fundamental to establish one’s bearings amidst the web of 
terminology weaved by legislators, judges, and scholars past and present who have 
devoted an earnest degree of attention to subnational intergovernmental relations.  
Ultimately at issue in this nationwide, centuries-long struggle to define the power 
boundaries of state and local governments – and it is and has been, most assuredly, a 
struggle – is local government autonomy, a condition of independence in communities’ 
decision-making that requires the broad conferral of some combination of powers, rights, 
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and privileges to substate political entities. This definition, though nominally an original 
take on the term, is rooted firmly in the findings of preceding studies and is only original 
insofar as it seeks to build upon and establish compatibility with conceptual nuances 
revealed through previous scholarship.  
It does so, firstly, by positing that local government autonomy is a “condition,” a state of 
being, rather than a system in and of itself. Therefore, policy actions directed toward the 
devolution of powers to localities can be understood as a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the achievement of autonomy at the local level.  
Secondly, it makes no attempt to proffer what specific conferrals are required to 
bring about a state of local government autonomy. Declining to set an arbitrary basket of 
rights, powers, and privileges allows for the reality that local government autonomy 
exists in any particular place during any particular policy regime much as concepts like 
liberty and economic opportunity do – rarely if ever either totally absent or totally present  
but, instead, often at some point on a continuum between the two – that point being, 
ultimately, the result of the policy decisions and both the official and unofficial opinions 
of multiple governing officials, as well as the opinions of the public at-large. It is 
especially important to account for this truth in one’s scholarly observations of U.S. 
substate intergovernmental relations, because states, the “laboratories of democracy” as 
Chief Justice Brandeis famously termed them, have held fast to that moniker in their 
dealings with the topic of devolution to localities. As the National League of Cities 
explains, “The Tenth Amendment reserved authority-giving powers to the states. It is not 
surprising, then, that there is a great diversity in state-local relations between, as well as 
within, states. This means that to speak of local government in the United States is to 
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speak of more than fifty different legal and political situations.”56 Table 2-1 provides 
quantitative evidence of this reality that is culled from a 2010 study by Wolman et al. 
Local government discretion, as Wolman et al. define it, is comprised of three quantified 
subdimensions: (1) Degree of Local Government Structural and Functional 
Responsibility and Legal Scope, (2) Fiscal Discretion Limits on Local Governments, and 
(3) Local Government Unconstrained Revenue; these were assessed together in order to 
create a holistic picture of local government autonomy as it exists in each of the 50 states 
and, in turn, to arrive at definitive state-by-state rankings (both cardinal and ordinal in 
                                                
56 “Local Government Authority,” National League of Cities, accessed April 1, 
2016. http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-
powers/local-government-authority 
Table 2-1  Source: Wolman et al., 2010 
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nature) of local government autonomy.57 The rankings, of course, lend implicit support to 
the notion of local government autonomy as existing on a continuum. It is also important 
to note that states not deemed to be “Dillon’s rule states” in this study (those in bold in 
Table 2-1) fall all over the map in terms of comparative substate autonomy; this is 
influential to the study at-hand in that it provides a clear justification for what the 
preceding paragraph conveys – an understanding of the actualization of the goal of local 
government autonomy as, to some degree, separate from the specific policy action of 
enacting home rule. 
Lastly, this study’s definition of local government autonomy makes no 
presumptions about the origins of the conferrals of rights, powers, and privileges that it 
deems to be a necessary condition of local government autonomy. The need for breadth 
in dealing with this facet of local government autonomy is less grounded in the practical 
than it is in the philosophical, stemming from a very fundamental question that has 
accompanied the debate about local government’s proper scope of authority since its 
infancy: what is the ultimate source from which local autonomy is derived? While the 
answer to that question may appear obvious, given the long history of state governments 
undertaking assorted policy actions in order to effect such conferrals, there is a tradition 
of American governmental philosophy that would maintain, in spite of this, that at some 
level, local rights, powers, and privileges are not the states’ to give – that, instead, there is 
an inherent right to local self-governance in the United States and that powers, privileges, 
and other rights necessary to exercise that right should be considered to be the innate and 
                                                
57 Harold Wolman, Robert McManmon, Michael Bell, and David Brunori, 
“Comparing Local Government Autonomy across States,” Proceedings of the Annual 
Conference on Taxation 101 (2008): 377-378. 
Table 2-1 Source: Wolman et al. (States in bold are non-Dillon’s Rule states) 
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fundamental prerogatives of local governing institutions. These sentiments are perhaps 
most clearly delineated in an 1871 decision rendered by Michigan Supreme Court Justice 
Thomas Cooley in the case People v. Hurlbut. Cooley, in a bold assertion of local self-
governance as an inevitable and inalienable right stemming from “constitutional 
freedom” and the American experience, counts this matter among those “things [that] are 
too plain to be written”: 
If this charter of state government which we call a constitution were all there was 
of constitutional command; if the usages, the customs, the maxims that have 
sprung from the habits of life, modes of thought, methods of trying facts by the 
neighborhood, and mutual responsibility in neighborhood interests, the precepts 
which have come from the revolutions which overturned tyrannies, the sentiments 
of manly independence and self control which impelled our ancestors to summon 
the local community to redress local evils, instead of relying upon king or 
legislature at a distance to do so; if a recognition of all these were to be stricken 
from the body of our constitutional law, a lifeless skeleton might remain, but the 
living spirit, that which gives it force and attraction, which makes it valuable and 
draws to it the affections of the people…this living and breathing spirit, which 
supplies interpretation of the words of the written charter, would be utterly lost 
and gone…With [the men who framed our institutions] it has been an axiom that 
our system was one of checks and balances; that each department of the 
government was a check upon the others, and each grade of government upon the 
rest…The State may mould (sic) local institutions according to its views of policy 
or expediency; but local government is matter of absolute right; and the State 
cannot take it away. It would be the boldest mockery to speak of a city as 
possessing municipal liberty where the State not only shaped its government but 
at discretion sent in its own agents to administer it or to call that system one of 
constitutional freedom under which it should be equally admissible to allow the 
people full control in their local affairs or no control at all.58 
 
The above passage, in particular the portion transcribed with emphasis added, has come 
to be known as the Cooley Doctrine, and the critical role its philosophical underpinnings 
have played in the evolving understanding of local governments’ roles and powers in the 
United States ought to compel any scholarly effort requiring a comprehensive definition 
of local government autonomy to accommodate for them. 
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B. Defining Key Terms: Home Rule 
 
Although it is fine and well to argue, on principle, that the existence of local 
autonomy should be more than evident without codification owing to the character of the 
American political system and the collective experiences of its citizens, it also bears 
mentioning that, by virtue of the same American political system, the United States 
possesses what has been widely recognized and celebrated as “a government of laws, not 
of men.” As the Founders themselves conceded through the passage of the Bill of Rights, 
authority that goes un-codified in a government of laws cannot be expected to endure 
indefinitely, and from this paradox arises the concept of home rule as it exists in 
America. Home rule refers to any system of state-local relations that empowers local 
governments to make certain administrative decisions without the necessity of seeking 
legislative approval for them. It is, quite simply, the necessary condition of local 
government autonomy; whenever and wherever increased local stature in governance is 
an explicit desire of a state’s policymaking community, home rule proposals are the most 
direct step that can be taken toward making that desire a reality. Because it is a far less 
ephemeral concept than the goal that prompts its existence, home rule lays claim to a 
somewhat less nuanced definition. However, it should be noted that, just as local 
government autonomy exists on a continuum, there are many gradations that exist 
between the complete absence of home rule and its absolute, unfettered presence. 
Where home rule is concerned, the elusiveness of its definition in this particular 
nation-state is more than likely a function of the history of local governments’ collective  
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legal status in the United States – a history that, as the National League of Cities notes, is 
marked by omissions of state-transcendent establishment and, in turn, by a confounding 
degree of interstate variation.59 
Yet, in spite of the complexity inherent in pinning down the concept of American 
home rule, there are important commonalities to be detected within pertinent scholarly 
literature. While, as Richardson notes, “Many different definitions exist for home rule,” 
this multiplicity of proposed meanings rarely stems from differences of opinion 
concerning home rule’s fundamental nature or intention. Richardson himself, by defining 
home rule “Most generally” as “a state constitutional provision or legislative action that 
provides a local government with a greater measure of self-government ability,” 
corroborates this statement.60 What’s more, a widespread understanding of home rule 
under American law is presented in much of the literature on the subject through 
discussion of home rule efforts’ broad points of contrast with the more specific 
pronouncement of Dillon’s Rule, a “rule of interpretation…named for Judge John Dillon 
of the Iowa Supreme Court, who established it firmly in a landmark 1868 case.”61  
Dillon’s Rule operates under the logic that, “As corporations are the mere 
creatures of law…and derive all their powers from the acts creating them, it is perfectly 
just and proper that they should be obliged strictly to…be confined in their operations to 
the mode, and manner, and subject matter prescribed.”62 In essence, then, a system of 
state-local relations emphatic of Dillon’s Rule is one wherein “local governments operate 
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61 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, “Local 
Government Autonomy,” 32. 
62 qtd. in Ibid. 
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only on those powers that have been explicitly granted to [them] by the state 
legislature,”63 and this system of more limited conferrals of rights upon government at the 
local level is, therefore, pitted dichotomously against the more conferral-rich nature of 
home rule. The historical-definitional narrative of home rule presented in this body of 
literature is most aptly described in a 1993 study authored by the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: 
Two legal concepts of local government have contended for ascendancy in the 
American federal system: home rule and creatures of the state. The home rule 
concept of granting greater discretionary authority to local governments has been 
gaining ground on the creatures-of-the-state concept of strict limits on local 
discretionary authority. Most states have adopted a system of devolved powers for 
local governments within which they can act freely.64 
 
These points of consensus, though, fall well short of addressing the nebulousness of the 
concept of home rule in its entirety. As the Advisory Commission’s aforementioned 
quote intimates, most states have, at the very least, cordoned off a selection of policy 
areas for the discretion of local governments, and this has occurred irrespective of the 
distinctions between home rule and the lack thereof; in Mississippi, for instance, one of 
the few remaining states identified as “not provid[ing] for municipal home rule,” 1985 
legislation established a still-extant enumeration of municipal home rule privileges and 
prohibitions that resulted in a limited conferral of decision-making to municipal 
governments. 
For the alleviation of this continued ambiguity, one must turn toward efforts that 
seek to evaluate home rule facet by facet. Seminal in this regard is Krane, Rigos, and 
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Hill’s Home Rule in America: A Fifty-State Handbook, arguably the most comprehensive 
treatment of American home rule yet to be published. The text is, upon inspection, far 
more than an overview of home rule policies; rather, it is, itself, a research effort, one 
conducted to address what Hanson identifies as a “blind spot” in academic research 
regarding “the constitutional, political, and fiscal ties that bind states and localities,” as 
well as “the complex interactions between state and local governments engaged in the 
delivery of public goods and services.”65 More specifically, Krane et al. seek to assess 
each state’s manifestation of home rule along a uniform set of categories, presenting 
these assessments individually and, additionally, presenting categorical results in 
appendices enabling interstate comparisons. Among the principal topics considered are 
Governmental Setting, Home Rule, Functions of Local Government, Fiscal Autonomy of 
Local Governments, Citizen Access to Local Government, and State-Local Relations.66 
The data sources chosen as a means of achieving measurements in these categories are 
multitudinous, commonly arising from “interviews with or surveys of local government 
officials” or “from government documents…or…newsletters produced by the state 
association of municipal or county officials.”67 Within the individual state reports, 
qualitative data is typically synthesized into statements of summary, while quantitative 
data is expressed through the presentation of descriptive statistics, frequently as 
percentages, and the graphical representation of those statistics. The results of these 
individual state evaluations are many and varied, but their primary importance for the 
                                                
65 R.L. Hanson, “The Interaction of State and Local Governments” in Governing 
Partners: State-local Relations in the United States, ed. R. Bish and E. Ostrom (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1998), 3. 
66 Krane et al., Home Rule in America, xi. 
67 Ibid. 
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proposal at hand arises from their use as a final source of data for the comparative portion 
of the study, which constructs 16 appendices to analyze the states’ qualitative 
categorizations; the appendices present the general type, eligibility criteria, and legal 
authority of each state’s home rule system, as well as their essential structural (difficulty 
of incorporation, number of available annexation methods, and difficulty of annexation), 
functional (governing responsibilities, economic development authority), and fiscal 
(balanced budget requirements, diversity of revenue sources, debt limits) 
characteristics.68 In this way, it is concluded, among other things, that “most states do not 
put eligibility restrictions on home rule,” that “states vary dramatically in the number of 
methods by which a municipality can annex areas…,” that “the property tax continues to 
be the primary source of local government revenues only for about half of the states 
listed,” and that “the new economic development authority granted to counties and 
municipalities greatly expands the discretion of local communities to shape their 
futures.”69 
                                                
68 Ibid., 471-474.  
69 Ibid. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 In assessing the proper path forward for the study at-hand – which, to reiterate, 
seeks to comparatively analyze the substantive implications of Dillon’s Rule and substate 
home rule through the lens of institutional theory – it is perhaps edifying to begin by 
referring back to Polski and Ostrom’s public policy-oriented interpretation of the 
Institutional Analysis and Design framework (see Figs. 2.1 and 2.2). While the research 
effort presented in this paper is not itself a policy analysis per se, its orientation is 
inherently toward playing a role in the wider process within public administration 
scholarship of critically assessing what are, at present, the two major alternatives of 
organizing American state-local power structures. Given the specific nature of these 
policy alternatives, it is proper to say, referring to Figure 2.2, that this paper is directed 
toward determining how outcomes differ based on variation in constitutional rules 
regarding local autonomy, with an ancillary interest in how interactions lead to the 
outcomes.  
To use another, more prevalent framework of policy analysis as a means of 
contextualization, Bardach’s Eightfold Path, this study is envisioned not as a self-
contained exploration of each of Bardach’s eight steps, but rather, as a contribution to the 
outcomes projection stage as that path is played out in full in the wider scholastic 
community.70 But why focus so intently on what is, ultimately, only one stage of the 
policy analysis process? Quite simply, the entire field’s analysis of these alternative 
                                                
70 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to 
More Effective Problem Solving (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2012), xvi.  
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means of organization is inhibited from moving forward to properly assess tradeoffs 
between the two and prescribe a course of action in light of these tradeoffs without first 
rigorously establishing outcomes related to Dillon’s Rule and home rule that extend 
beyond the abstract.  
There is, additionally, intrinsic value for practitioners of public administration in 
the completion of a project with this focus. As the preliminary literature review makes 
evident, extensive accounts exist that are concerned with how Dillon’s Rule and home 
rule-guided relationships stack up against each other based on abstract notions of 
autonomy and the like, and indisputably, such efforts hold a certain degree of value for 
the practitioner as well as the scholar. Yet, infinitely more valuable for practitioners, who 
have to anticipate and react to tangible situations, would be a detailed, comparative, non-
prescriptive, and concrete results-driven account of what one can reasonably expect from 
each mode of state-local relationship. The author of this paper expressly intends for it to 
be a first fruit of sorts in the development of this type of account. 
I. The Systematic Literature Review 
This is not to say that the current body of public administration literature contains 
no information whatsoever about the substantive impacts of Dillon’s Rule and home rule. 
Yet, it is certainly true that studies regarding these on-the-ground implications are 
presently few and far between, scattered about numerous, issue-specific corners of public 
administration scholarship and oftentimes geared only partially, if at all, toward 
comparative analysis of the two systems’ impacts. Thus, gathering and synthesizing what 
these distinct, isolated studies have to say about both state-local power structures is a 
worthy goal in furtherance of our collective understanding of the relationship between 
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state and local governments – and gathering and synthesizing relevant information in this 
way is the specific means whereby the study at-hand seeks to go about the business of 
presenting a comparative analysis of the on-the-ground impacts of Dillon’s Rule and 
substate home rule.  
Technically speaking, this sort of research methodology is known as a systematic 
literature review or, simply, a systematic review. Originally a product of the biomedical 
field, in which costs associated with the execution of independent, original testing are 
especially steep, the systematic literature review has been co-opted, repurposed, and 
reimagined in recent decades to create a methodology suitable for both quantitative and 
qualitative research in the social sciences. To date, the most extensive account of 
systematic review protocol for such purposes is Petticrew and Roberts’ 2006 publication, 
Systematic Reviews in the Social Sciences: A Practical Guide,71 which serves as this 
research effort’s principal source of methodological guidance. 
At the outset of this discussion, it bears mentioning that, while there are 
undoubtedly similarities to be observed, the systematic literature review differs in 
substantial ways from traditional literature reviews like the one carried out in the 
preceding chapter; these are most precisely perceived as separate entities within the same 
family. Elucidating these differences, Petticrew and Roberts maintain that the systematic 
review is “more ‘fit for the purpose’ of answering specific questions and testing 
hypotheses than the traditional review,” being “less of a discussion of the literature, and 
more of a scientific tool”72:  
                                                
71 Mark Petticrew and Helen Roberts, Systematic Reviews in the Social Sciences: 
A Practical Guide (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006). 
72 Ibid., 10. 
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…those who use research information, among whom we can number citizens, 
researchers, and people making decisions about the delivery or organization of 
services, rely on reviews to help organize and prioritize the most relevant 
information. Alongside ‘‘traditional’’ or ‘‘narrative’’ reviews, a new type of 
review has appeared in recent years: the systematic literature review…Systematic 
reviews are literature reviews that adhere closely to a set of scientific methods 
that explicitly aim to limit systematic error (bias), mainly by attempting to 
identify, appraise and synthesize all relevant studies (of whatever design) in order 
to answer a particular question (or set of questions). In carrying out this task they 
set out their methods in advance, and in detail...73 
 
Thus, the systematic review process is, on the whole, more targeted and more empirical 
in its approach than the conventional literature review and is a versatile means of 
bringing together the findings of disparate research efforts to engender new connections, 
insights, and conclusions. Two further points advanced by Petticrew and Roberts are 
instructive. The first is that assessing the effectiveness of a particular policy intervention 
or interventions is taken to be the single most suitable objective for this methodology; “in 
answering questions about effectiveness or causation,” they assert, “a well-conducted 
systematic review should be considered the most authoritative source of information.”74 
Secondly, they corroborate the value of a systematic review in a nascent or 
underdeveloped field, noting, “even when a field is immature, it is important to cumulate 
prospectively rather than wait for some later date when ‘enough’ evidence has 
accumulated, and consolidation can occur.”75  
II. Applying the Systematic Review Methodology 
 Petticrew and Roberts identify seven distinct steps to the execution of a 
comprehensive literature review: 
 
                                                
73 Ibid., 9. 
74 Ibid., 10. 
75 Ibid., 35. 
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1. Clearly define the question that the review is setting out to answer. 
2. Determine the types of studies that need to be located in order to answer your 
question. 
3. Carry out a comprehensive literature search to locate those studies. 
4. Screen the results of that search (that is, sift through the retrieved studies, 
deciding which ones look as if they fully meet the inclusion criteria, and thus need 
more detailed examination, and which do not). 
5. Critically appraise the included studies. 
6. Synthesize the studies... 
7. Disseminate the findings of the review.76 
 
The question that the comprehensive review at-hand seeks to answer is twofold. First of 
all, what are the substantive impacts of Dillon’s Rule and home rule? And secondly, how 
do these impacts differ?  
To provide sufficient answers to this line of inquiry, studies in the social sciences 
of three different kinds must be consulted; in descending order of preferability, these are 
(1) comparative analyses of the substantive impacts of home rule and Dillon’s Rule, (2) 
case studies directly involving the substantive impacts of either Dillon’s Rule or home 
rule, and (3) analyses that project substantive impacts in correlation to the degree of local 
autonomy exhibited. This preference ordering is rooted in the rather intuitive operative 
logic that studies whose missions most closely align with the systematic review are most 
desirable. Thus, research that examines the impacts of both systems of state-local 
relations in comparison with one another is clearly most relevant, followed by that which 
discusses the impacts of one of the two systems. Research efforts that assess or establish 
a relationship between the degree of local autonomy and real or projected on-the-ground 
outcomes also surely have relevance for this study, but these are less preferable owing to 
a basic fact revealed in the preliminary literature review: though local autonomy is 
                                                
76 Ibid., 27. 
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always and everywhere the stated aim of adopting home rule, this condition does not 
always and everywhere materialize under a system of home rule. Given the type of 
articles that will be sought after in this review, it seems probable that the body of 
resources surveyed in this research effort will be close to equal portions quantitative and 
qualitative, with perhaps a slight qualitative bent. 
 The literature search was conducted by utilizing One Search, an online “unified 
discovery service” provided by the University of Mississippi to its students and faculty 
“that searches the [University of Mississippi’s] library catalog, article databases, 
electronic resources, digital collections and more from one search box.”77 In essence, One 
Search is an aggregate search engine through which one can conduct a simple Boolean 
search of all physical and electronic resources in the University’s possession and all e-
books and articles accessible through the variety of academic databases to which the 
University subscribes, with the results of the search being sorted for relevance 
algorithmically. One Search is a particularly appealing means of conducting a literature 
search for a systematic review, given that resources of every kind and of every origin are 
granted parity in its search process, leaving relevance to the searched phrase or phrases as 
the sole factor for a resource’s inclusion in the search results and for its ranking within 
said search results. For an in-depth breakdown of the sources utilized, see Appendix 1. 
The actual literature search process employed in this study modified the One 
Search algorithm such that the resources considered and ranked were limited to books 
and e-books, scholarly articles, and conference materials and, furthermore, such that the 
online databases consulted were constrained to the 10 databases that constitute One 
                                                
77 “One Search,” University of Mississippi Libraries, accessed March 30, 2016, 
http://www.libraries.olemiss.edu/uml/one-search.   
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Search’s “Basic Database Set” and to those categorized by the University of Mississippi 
Libraries for “General Social Sciences,” “General Humanities,” “Government,” “Political 
Science,” and “Public Policy Leadership” use.78 Three separate searches were conducted 
in this manner, in a pattern consistent with the aforementioned preference ordering of 
studies: first for “ ‘home+rule’ + ‘Dillon+Rule,’ ” then for “ ‘Dillon+Rule,’ ” and lastly, 
for “ ‘local+government+autonomy’ + ‘United+States.’ ”79 
 The results of these three searches were then screened in the same order in which 
they were conducted, with a particular emphasis on the content of abstracts, where 
included, and on the content of introductory and results/conclusions sections where they 
were not, with the goal of eventually arriving at a body of studies whose findings would 
be studied in-depth for synthesis. Throughout the screening process, the following six 
criteria, listed in no particular order, bore the greatest influence on inclusion/exclusion: 
● Degree of alignment with the objectives of the review, as previously discussed 
● Presentation of empirical research with a transparent methodology 
● Recentness of the research effort presented by the resource 
● Congruence of setting and chosen scale of analysis (United States of America, 
state government vs. local government – municipality, county, town) 
                                                
78 “Database A-Z,” University of Mississippi Libraries, accessed March 30, 2016, 
http://www.libraries.olemiss.edu/uml/database/glossary/all. 
79 An as-yet unexplained portion of the operative logic behind the selection of 
these search phrases deserves discussion. “ ‘Home+rule’ + ‘Dillon+Rule’ ” requires no 
national modifier to ensure that it will yield a list tailored to the American state-local 
experience, because this dichotomy only exists in the United States. Nor does “ 
‘Dillon+Rule’ ” require a national keyword to tailor the search results to ones with 
American implications, for much the same reason: Dillon’s Rule is an American legal 
doctrine. However, local government autonomy is not a U.S.-specific concern, so the 
inclusion of keywords pertaining to the United States is a logical step to ensure the 
filtering out of several sources beyond the scope of this study.  
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● Generalizability of the resource’s empirical findings 
● Contribution to the diversity of issue perspectives among research efforts 
consulted for synthesis 
Each of the articles selected for inclusion in the synthesizing process was then pored over 
in full and subjected to critical appraisal. Table 3-1, taken from Petticrew and Roberts, 
lists a number of questions that lend themselves to producing thorough critical appraisals 
of predominantly qualitative bodies of research; these questions constituted the primary 
foci of the critical appraisal process undertaken in this study.80 This article-by-article 
appraisal process was conducted externally, rather than presented in full in the findings 
section; this is a part-stylistic, part-methodological decision that, in addition to 
economizing on valuable space for revelatory discussion of this review process’s ultimate 
findings, provided an additional inclusion/exclusion failsafe: should any included sources 
abjectly fail to meet several of these criteria upon in-depth reading, they would be 
eliminated during this process. Nonetheless, for the sake of full transparency regarding 
the validity of the sources that were ultimately consulted to extract themes from the 
literature sample, the methodology of every study identified in Chapter 4 as a key 
corroborating source for a theme is summarized prior to discussion of their results. 
 
                                                
80 The literature search will almost assuredly produce a plethora of both 
qualitative and quantitative studies. Unfortunately, there is, as yet, little consensus among 
practitioners of this nascent social sciences-oriented systematic review process regarding 
how to achieve parity of appraisal requirements among studies of both kinds. Given this 
fact, it seems prudent to settle upon a “least common denominator,” so to speak, of 
appraisal criteria, deferring to the least constrictive set of codified standards that exist. 
Upon careful consideration of the sparse social sciences systematic review literature to-
date, Petticrew and Roberts’ 18 criteria for appraisals of qualitative studies appear to fit 
that bill. 
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Eighteen	Appraisal	Questions	for	Qualitative	Research 
1. How	credible	are	the	findings?	
2. How	has	knowledge	or	understanding	been	extended	by	the	research?	
3. How	well	does	the	evaluation	address	its	original	aims	and	purpose?	
4. How	well	is	the	scope	for	drawing	wider	inference	explained?	
5. How	defensible	is	the	research	design?	
6. How	defensible	is	the	research	design?	
7. How	well	defended	are	the	sample	design/target	selection	of	cases/documents?	
8. How	well	is	the	eventual	sample	composition	and	coverage	described?	
9. How	well	was	the	data	collection	carried	out?	
10. How	well	has	the	approach	to,	and	formulation	of,	analysis	been	conveyed?	
11. How	well	are	the	contexts	of	data	sources	retained	and	portrayed?	
12. How	well	has	diversity	of	perspective	and	content	been	explored?	
13. How	well	have	detail,	depth,	and	complexity	of	the	data	been	conveyed?	
14. How	clear	are	the	links	between	data,	interpretation	and	conclusions?	
15. How	clear	and	coherent	is	the	reporting?	
16. How	clear	are	the	assumptions/theoretical	perspectives/values	that	have	shaped	
the	form	and	output	of	the	evaluation?	
17. What	evidence	is	there	of	attention	to	ethical	issues?	
18. How	adequately	has	the	research	process	been	documented?	
Table 3-1   Source: Petticrew and Roberts, 2006 
That themes were extracted from the sample and will constitute this study’s 
principal findings brings this methodological discussion to its conclusion, as this is the 
means of study synthesis selected for the research effort at-hand. Thematic representation 
of the literature sample follows logically from the qualitative research scholarship of 
Creswell, who posits that “qualitative research consists of preparing and organizing the 
data (i.e., text data as in transcripts…) for analysis, then reducing data into themes…and 
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finally representing the data in figures, tables or a discussion.”81 Indeed, in adherence to 
Creswell’s final point, a table summarizing the study’s findings brings Chapter 4 to a 
close. 
                                                
81 Cresswell, 2007. 148 
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Chapter 4: Results of Comprehensive Review 
 
I. Descriptive Statistics 
The first Boolean search (“‘home+rule’ + ‘Dillon+Rule’”) yielded 221 
independent search results. The second Boolean search (“‘Dillon+Rule’”) yielded 356 
independent search results. The final Boolean search (“‘local+government+autonomy’ + 
‘United+States’”) yielded 332 independent search results. After accounting for results 
that appeared in more than one of the three conducted searches, the second Boolean 
search yielded 66 results unique from those retrieved in the first search, and the third 
Boolean search yielded 231 results unique from those retrieved in the first and second 
searches. Thus, the literature search process retrieved a total of 518 independent search 
results across all three searches. 
Screening the literature search’s 518 independent results through strict application 
of the inclusion/exclusion criteria resulted in 52 sources being culled from the first 
search, 10 from the second search, and 17 from the third search, for a total selected body 
of 79 works. After reviewing the full contents of each of these sources and assessing each 
source’s validity through applicable critical appraisal questioning, owing to less-than-
anticipated relevance and/or methodological rigor, five of the results culled from the first 
search were eliminated from the selected body (52 ! 47 sources), four of the results 
culled from the second search were eliminated from the selected body (10 ! 6 sources), 
and ten of the results culled from the third search were eliminated from the selected body 
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(17 ! 7 sources), thus paring down the selected sample of the literature from 79 sources 
to 60. 
II. Themes Extracted from the Selected Literature 
 What lessons can be gleaned from the 60 sources this study’s methodology has 
brought to the fore from across the vast landscape of public administration scholarship? 
Collectively, these sources reveal eight broad-based thematic findings, of which four 
draw direct contrasts between the substantive results of home rule and pure Dillon’s Rule, 
two reflect on key areas in which the substantive impacts of these systems appear 
negligible, and the remaining two elucidate factors that complicate the prior findings. 
Among each category of findings, themes will be summarized in descending order of 
prevalence in the literature sample and substantiated by relevant excerpts from said 
sample. Given that the question that has served as the impetus of this study is a 
comparative one, it seems logical to begin by looking, first, to the comparative findings. 
A. Differences in System Impacts 
1. Number of Local Governments – Through the proliferation of both general-purpose 
and special-purpose governments, home rule systems concentrate more governmental 
power at the local level by virtue of sheer numbers and tend to engender comparatively 
more bureaucratic sprawl in public service delivery, not less. 
 Not surprisingly, given that a common argument for implementing a state-local 
relationship defined by home rule is that doing so will scale back the state-to-local 
bureaucracy involved in public service delivery and thereby increase the overall quality 
thereof, a substantial portion of the literature sample is devoted to examining how the 
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contours of service delivery systems and the character of the services delivered are 
impacted by the rules-in-use governing the state-local relationship. These are especially 
predominant foci among articles of the kind that this study assigns the highest priority, 
those that comparatively analyze the substantive impacts of home rule and Dillon’s Rule. 
Moreover, multiple studies within the sample that project substantive impacts in 
correlation to degree of local autonomy are also similarly directed. 
 As will be revealed more fully in ensuing pages, prevailing logics advanced by 
proponents of home rule regarding service quality differences find little to no empirical 
support in this literature sample, but at least one systemic contrast concerning service 
delivery does: as it happens, home rule does, in fact, coincide with greater concentration 
of government power at the local level by sheer numbers. That is, home rule systems of 
state-local relations tend to spawn greater numbers of both general- and special-purpose 
governments than do Dillon’s Rule-predominant state-local relationships, thus 
contributing to more fractured channels of local service delivery. 
 Kim and Law’s “History, Institutions, and Cities: A View from the Americas” and 
Carr’s “Local Government Autonomy and State Reliance on Special District 
Governance” are the two most in-depth explorations of this point of contrast included in 
the literature sample. Kim and Law, in service to their wider purpose of “identifying the 
impact of institutions on economic geography” as experienced in the U.S. and Canada,82 
conduct two regression estimation-rooted analyses that incorporate “a municipal home 
rule status indicator equal to 1 if the state has home rule status by 1950 or by 1970, and 0 
otherwise,” based on whether or not “municipalities within the state [had] some degree of 
                                                
82 Sukkoo Kim and Marc T. Law, “History, Institutions, and Cities: A View from 
the Americas,” Journal of Regional Science 52, no. 1 (2012): 10. 
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formal and functional home rule” by those decades as reported in a 2001 study by Krane, 
Rigos, and Hill.83 In the first regression estimation, the dependent variable is the number 
of “subcounty general-purpose government units in U.S. states”; the central equation is 
estimated separately for each decade between 1960 and 2000, inclusive, using home rule 
status by 1950 as a measure of political decentralization for the entire span of the study, 
while also using home rule status by 1970 “to proxy for political decentralization” from 
1980 to 2000.84 The resultant estimates indicate that for all years in the last two decades 
examined (1980-2000), “states that had implemented municipal home rule by 1950 or 
1970 had more subcounty general-purpose local government units,” while “For 2000, 
home rule status increased the log number of local government units by more than one-
third of a standard deviation.”85  
The second regression estimation analysis employed by Kim and Law uses the 
same bivariate measure of home rule, defined the exact same way, but takes on a more 
urban-specific focus by setting the dependent variable as the “log number of subcounty 
general-purpose government units in U.S. metro areas” and does not incorporate time-
series data for that variable, looking only at data from a set year (1997).86 The coefficient 
estimates for the home rule indicator produced thusly are noted as being “positive and 
significant in most regressions.” Based on these results, Kim and Law conclude that 
“Decentralization of political power away from states and toward municipalities increases 
                                                
83 Ibid., 36. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. The year 1997 is used for consistency with other regression estimation-
rooted analyses of metropolitan fragmentation that are conducted in this source but that 
are beyond the scope of the study at-hand’s home rule/Dillon’s Rule-oriented discussion. 
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the number of local government units,” and moreover, that the same process of 
decentralization “has contributed to greater metropolitan fragmentation.”87 
 Carr, for his part, focuses on special district governments, which “operate along  
with counties, municipal governments (which may include villages and/or towns), and in 
a few states, townships as a system of local government”88 and are distinct among local 
governing institutions as “instruments of competition and cooperation” by virtue of their 
innate “geographic flexibility…and ability to overlap existing governments and other 
arrangements.”89 First and foremost among the three questions Carr sets out to answer in 
this study is “What is the relationship between state grants of local autonomy to 
municipal governments and the use of special purpose governments?”90 To this end, he 
conducts a negative binomial regression to assess the correlation of home rule, measured 
by four separate dimensional scores (structural, functional, fiscal, and personnel 
management autonomy, respectively) based on a 1992 report of the Advisory Committee 
on Intergovernmental Relations and Krane, Rigos, and Hill’s influential 2000 
assessments of degree of home rule,91 to the number of special district governments, 
clustered by state, as reported in Census Bureau data from 1992, 1997, and 2002.92  
Though Carr hypothesizes that “greater autonomy for municipal governments is 
associated with less reliance on special district governments,”93 the results of this 
                                                
87 Ibid. 
88 Jered B. Carr, “Local Government Autonomy and State Reliance on Special 
District Governments” (presentation, Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political 
Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 7-10, 2005): 5. 
89 Ibid., 3. 
90 Ibid., 12. 
91 Ibid., 27-28. 
92 Ibid., 14. 
93 Ibid., 12. 
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regression analysis firmly indicate that “expectations that states permitting autonomy to 
local governments on questions of what functions to provide and flexibility in how to 
fund them would be less likely to rely strongly on special purpose governments are not 
supported by these analyses,” and, further still, that “municipal autonomy on revenue and  
expenditure policies is associated with an increased reliance on district governments.”94   
2. Local Budgetary Responsiveness – Home rule governance leads to comparatively 
greater local budgetary responsiveness to community needs and also likely lends itself to 
greater budgetary sensitivity to the shifting wants of the public as expressed electorally. 
However, under home rule, local governments’ total spending also demonstrates a 
comparatively stronger tendency to exceed what the typical resident desires, though this 
effect is offset somewhat by interjurisdictional competition.  
 Second only to questions about service delivery in the literature sample are those 
directed toward discerning how local governments allocate public funds to deliver such 
services through the budgeting process. Studies of the same kinds that contribute to the 
sample’s collective wisdom regarding service delivery – those that either comparatively 
analyze the substantive impacts of home rule and Dillon’s Rule or project substantive 
impacts in correlation to degree of local autonomy – also contribute to the literature 
sample’s examination of local budgeting, and their findings paint a picture of local 
budgetary decision-making that sees home rule status as a mark of comparatively greater 
allocative responsiveness to the needs and the wants of local publics, to a fault – that fault 
being spending more in total than residents would prefer.  
                                                
94 Ibid., 15 
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First of all, as Kwon, Choi, and Bae demonstrate in their application of 
punctuated-equilibrium theory to county emergency management funding in Florida, 
local governments empowered by home rule tend to have budgets that are more sensitive 
to emergent community needs.95 Kwon et al. have two interwoven goals: (1) applying 
punctuated-equilibrium theory, which “focus[es] on examining how accurately 
incrementalism represents policy processes in the real world,”96 to this scale of analysis 
for the first time and (2) “investigat[ing] whether different patterns of punctuations in the 
local emergency management policy process result from different local institutional 
factors.”97 In advancement of this second goal, the scholars identify two major, 
potentially differentiating institutional factors among county governments, “reforming 
form of county government” and “acquiring home rule authority from their state 
                                                
95 Sung-Wook Kwon, Sang Ok Choi, and Sang-Seok Bae, “Effects of Political 
Institutions on Punctuated-Equilibrium in Local Emergency Management Policy 
Processes: Examination of County Governments in Florida, U.S.,” Lex Localis – Journal 
of Local Self-Government 11, no. 2 (2013).  
 
Though a non-case study source employing a scale of analysis that is contained within a 
single state-local regime would typically be of somewhat debatable relevance given the 
review’s two central questions, the Florida state-local relationship, which includes a 
patchwork of counties, some with charters conferring broad home rule powers and others 
whose interactions with the state are governed purely by Dillon’s Rule, is structured in 
such a way as to make county-to-county comparisons of local governments both valid 
and pertinent. The only institutional difference to consider is that under a system like 
Florida’s, only those counties that at one point expressed a desire to acquire home rule 
sufficiently to gain a home rule charter are governed by home rule; if anything, this 
should have the effect of slightly exaggerating the substantive impacts of state conferral 
of home rule by reducing the incidence of local governments having home rule powers 
but being reluctant to exercise them. Particularly given that a large number of state-local 
regimes’ rules-in-use treat different local governments of the same type differently (e.g., 
based on population), this effect was not taken to be sufficient grounds for this study’s 
exclusion from the selected sample; however, only two non-case study intrastate 
examinations are included in the literature sample, both of which exploit Florida’s county 
home rule patchwork for their analyses. 
96 Ibid., 195. 
97 Ibid., 194. 
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governments.”98 Kwon et al., noting that “In Florida…charter counties can exercise their 
own judicial, legislative, and administrative power as long as they do not violate state 
statutes…[and] have more discretion in the creation of new revenue sources and the 
expenditure of those revenues,” expect that “When they have home rule authority, 
counties are less limited by state rules and have more authority to self-govern,” and that 
“in responding to emergency situations, non-charter counties will experience less 
dramatic changes in the policy process;” thus, they hypothesize that “Counties with home 
rule charters are likely to show a higher level of punctuations in emergency management 
policy processes.99 
In order to apply PET to this situation, Kwon et al. use kurtosis analysis, an   
assessment that tests the distribution of policy changes over time, typically in terms of 
budgetary allocations; a normal distribution is taken to represent incrementalism – 
gradual change over time – whereas a leptokurtic distribution “with high central 
concentration of changes and fat tails in sides is assumed to support punctuated-
equilibrium policy processes that includes both incremental stability and abrupt large-
scale changes.”100 In this case, the conventional unit of impact is used: “kurtosis of the 
distribution in emergency management budget changes for all counties as well as groups 
of counties with different political institutions” is analyzed, based on cross-sectional 
panel data from 65 Florida counties collected from 1993 to 2008. The results confirm the 
hypothesis: Kwon et al. find “consistently…that counties with their own home rule 
authority have more leptokurtic distribution in emergency management expenditure 
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changes,” and they conclude by asserting that “Reformed county governments that have 
either commission-manager/mayor form or home rule authority or both tend to more 
quickly prioritize and focus their attention on emergency incidents.”101 
Not only are public needs met more readily under home rule, but also partisan-
defined shifts in public funding emphases, as expressed electorally, are stronger where 
local autonomy exists. Gerber and Hawkins provide an illustrative demonstration of this 
point in their assessment of mayoral partisan impact on policymaking in the 130 largest 
U.S. cities as of 2007,102 in which they hypothesize that “the influence of partisanship on 
local policy will be stronger in areas like public safety where overlapping authority is 
less, and weaker in areas like taxation and social policy where overlapping authority is 
greater.”103 They test this hypothesis by compiling mayoral election returns from across 
the United States from 1990 to 2006 and merging these data with city fiscal data from the 
same timeframe, ultimately finding that their original hypothesis was correct: “When 
Democrats narrowly win the mayor’s chair, spending on policies such as policing – a 
policy area defined by low levels of overlapping authority – commonly declines relative 
to total spending,” whereas it does not when similar cities elect Republican or 
Independent mayors; this goes to show, in the minds of Gerber and Hawkins, that “There 
might not be a Republican way to collect the trash, but there is a Republican way to 
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spend on policing and fire protection,” and these differences seem to show themselves 
because of, among other factors, the lack of state-level interference.104 
In a more directly relevant and more institution-minded approach to assessing 
local governments’ sensitivity to voters’ desires, Turnbull and Geon first apply revealed 
preference methodology to determine which U.S. counties’ expenditure decisions fail to 
satisfy the median voter hypothesis (MVH) – a competitive-equilibrium-analogous state 
in which “the median income voter’s optimum characterizes the community choice under 
pure democracy” – and then utilize probit analysis to assess which internal and external 
factors impacting local governance are associated with counties that do satisfy the 
MVH.105 The study relies on 1990 expenditure data from a sample of 2,243 counties 
covering 38 states, which is culled from a variety of public sources and placed in a cross-
section index.106 This county data is subjected, state by state, to Weak Axiom of 
Revealed Preferences (WARP) and General Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) 
testing that assumes “no specific functional forms for the underlying utility or demand 
functions”; testing only indicates that data are consistent or inconsistent with the 
MVH.107 
In preliminary discussions of the external factors faced by county governments, 
Turnbull and Geon discuss the importance of “The degree of home rule (or its absence)” 
as “one observable measure of how strict those [external] constraints might be,” noting:  
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There are competing hypotheses about how home rule, or its antithesis Dillon’s 
rule, affects county government behavior…On one hand, the pressures of 
interjurisdiction competition or the threat of residential migration might be 
sufficient to ensure the dominance of the median voter’s position in local 
government…On the other hand, home rule can push the equilibrium away from 
the MVH when intergovernmental competition is not strong enough to offset the 
local government tendency to pursue its own expansionary objectives.108 
 
Turnbull and Geon surmise, through this discussion, that “the home rule question is 
fundamentally an empirical issue that can be resolved only by appealing to the data,”109 
in which they “include Degree of Home Rule as [the] measure of how binding [external] 
constraints on range of functions are on county governments,”110 operationalizing this 
entity “as an index ranging in value from one (strict Dillon’s Rule or no home rule) to 
four (strict home rule), based on the classification system of Krane et al. Ultimately, after 
holding constant other known factors that affect county behavior, the results bear out 
what is called the leviathan hypothesis, which “maintains that the local government is 
less likely to satisfy the MVH under the unrestricted home rule than under the restrictive 
Dillon’s rule”; thus, “It appears that external constraints prevent local governments from 
unilaterally expanding activities beyond what their constituents most prefer,”111 although 
it also appears that the expansionary tendencies of local government are mitigated 
(statistically insignificantly) if exposed to the “horizontal (and vertical) competition 
effects of being in a metropolitan area.”112  
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3. Local Revenue Streams – Diversification of local finances under home rule. 
Monolithic presence of the property tax under pure Dillon's Rule state-local 
relationships. 
The topic of how local governments accrue revenue – and most specifically, how 
many revenue sources various substate governments make use of in order to finance their 
operations –is assessed in tandem with a measure of home rule or municipal autonomy in 
multiple sample sources, and in each of these assessments, home rule-empowered local 
governments are shown to actively utilize a broader portfolio of revenue streams than do 
governments of the same type in Dillon’s Rule-emphatic state-local arrangements. And in 
an important corollary to this observation from the literature sample, local governments 
in Dillon’s Rule states tend to exhibit a strong reliance on revenues gathered by way of 
the most traditional and ubiquitous approach to collecting local government funds, the 
property tax. 
 The single most comprehensive treatment of this relationship revealed through the 
literature search process emanates from the work of Mikesell and Mullens, who 
incorporate “Existence of Dillon’s Rule” into their multivariate analysis of how structural 
and institutional factors contribute to locality-to-locality variations in the property tax 
burdens and effective tax rates faced by American citizens.113 Their chosen scale of 
analysis is “households across the United States.” Mikesell and Mullens first consult data 
culled from the 1990 and 2000 censuses and Annual Community Survey results between 
the years 2005 and 2007, inclusive, “to evaluate residential property tax burdens across 
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substate areas and time in all 50 states” and then combine said data with federally 
collected survey results on government revenue and expenses and “socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics from a variety of sources” in order to “map individual 
household data to Public Use Microdata Areas…in each state,” thus providing the 
comprehensive national picture their scale of analysis requires.114 The expressed logic for 
their selection of Dillon’s Rule as an independent variable in the study (represented as a 
binary variable where 1 signifies its existence and 0 signifies its absence)115 centers on 
the fact that, without home rule, “Localities do not have free choice and…do not have the 
ability to seek out other fiscal alternatives [to the property tax], in terms of either  
taxing or spending.”116  
As a result of these “few options for fiscal creativity,” Mikesell and Mullens 
express an expectation that “states in which Dillon’s Rule strictly applies are likely to 
host households bearing higher property tax burdens.” This expectation is ultimately 
confirmed in the study’s findings, which demonstrate that “Households in states 
classified as employing Dillon’s Rule experienced slightly higher property tax burdens 
and 11 percent higher effective tax rates.”117 By the same token, “Property tax burdens on 
households in states that allow local jurisdictions access to alternative tax instruments, 
such as income and sales taxes, are substantially lower.”118  
Another important analysis of local government revenue diversity is provided by 
Carroll and Johnson, who focus on “revenue diversification among town governments by 
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examining towns within five states: Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin,” their sample thus selected because “These are the only states in which all 
towns maintain the traditional and unique governing structure of the town meeting…”119 
Though Carroll and Johnson’s efforts are primarily concerned with determining “the 
extent to which towns have diversified revenue structures,” they recognize as an 
important ancillary goal the assessment of differences in revenue diversity that might 
stem from two institutional factors, namely, the degree of home rule available to towns 
and the state’s imposition of direct tax and expenditure limits (TELs) on town 
governments.120 Thus, they group the towns into three categories by state conditions: 
towns affected by TELs operating under Dillon’s Rule (Wisconsin), towns with home 
rule and no TELs (Connecticut and Maine), and towns not affected by TELs and 
operating under Dillon’s Rule (Vermont and Minnesota). Carroll and Johnson then 
calculate multiple indexed measures of the revenue diversification exhibited in each 
category based on the methodologies of and data consulted by four previous revenue 
diversification studies. Lastly, Carroll and Johnson implement an original reprisal of 
these index formulas developed especially to reflect the limited diversification capacity 
of towns compared to municipalities and counties, applying it this new measure to census 
data from 1972 to 2002.121 
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Though Carroll and Johnson’s expectations about revenue diversification among 
towns are “mixed” in light of this very limited capacity, they expect, not unlike Mikesell 
and Mullens, that “Dillon’s rule towns might have lower levels of diversification because 
they simply cannot generate revenue from a variety of sources.”122 And on the whole, the 
results of Carroll and Johnson’s study, though somewhat weak owing to the simple truth 
that towns are “often highly dependent on property taxation because these entities do not 
receive much intergovernmental funding compared to other types of governments,”123 fall 
in lock step with those of the Mikesell and Mullens study, as well. Analysis based on 
previous formulations of the diversification index demonstrates “systemic variation in the 
levels of diversification exhibited by towns affected directly by…home rule 
provisions.”124 Though Wisconsin towns’ dealings with TELs propel their revenue 
diversification higher than towns in any other observed state, “the towns in Vermont in 
Minnesota, which are Dillon’s rule entities and are not affected by TELs, systematically 
exhibit the lowest mean and median levels of diversification,” while “towns with home 
rule status that are not affected by TELs…exhibit more diversification than Vermont and 
Minnesota towns…”125 Interestingly, under the new index advanced by Carroll and 
Johnson, both Dillon’s Rule and home rule towns that are unaffected by TELs appear to 
converge, “exhibit[ing] similar trends in diversification during the last two decades 
[examined],” but the preponderance of the evidence is such that Carroll and Johnson 
conclude, unequivocally, that “home rule provisions…affect levels of diversification 
among towns” – and, what’s more, that “It is plausible to expect these legislative 
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differences to influence levels of diversification among other local governments as 
well.”126 
4. Local Legal Capacity for Social Policy Innovation – Contemporary legal parameters 
for local government action under home rule, in many cases where social ramifications 
are paramount, validate an array of local interventions. Strict adherence to Dillon's Rule 
has the potential, sometimes realized, to present a barrier to such substate interventions. 
 By far, the single most prevalent type of source in all parts of the systematic 
review process, from the 518 initial results of the literature search to the 60 sources from 
the search that met both the selection criteria and the standards of the critical appraisal, is 
the law school journal article. Many of these articles examine the status of home rule or 
Dillon’s rule in a particular state or in a particular state dealing with a particular issue – 
qualities that firmly place them in the second-most preferred category of sources. These 
articles, along with public administration case studies and a handful of law journal 
articles that comparatively analyze multiple state-local regimes, constitute this study’s 
findings on local legal capacity. Not all are dedicated to social policymaking, which 
explains why this contrast is listed fourth in prevalence, but those that are speak with 
relative unanimity in declaring home rule status a helpful force in the quest for local 
social innovation and declaring Dillon’s Rule an occasional roadblock. 
 Dalmat, for instance, assesses the legal viability of efforts directed toward 
“bringing economic justice closer to home” through the enactment of municipal 
minimum wage ordinances. To do so, he establishes a novel means of assessing the case 
to be made for wage ordinance validity and applies it to each of the 50 state-local policy 
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regimes. The assessment procedure is comprised of two parts: first, determining if a 
municipal government has the requisite authority to pass a wage ordinance “given the 
particular delegation of power by a state to its local governments,” and secondly, 
determining if the municipal regulation would be at odds with state regulation of 
minimum wages in such a manner that it would prompt state preemption.127 Applying this 
procedure rigorously for each state-local relationship, all the while being mindful of the 
subtle but important distinctions between imperio and legislative home rule, Dalmat finds 
that such ordinances would only be expressly prohibited in about a quarter of the states, 
Dillon’s Rule states and “both imperio and legislative states that have expressly denied 
local governments such power,” while “local minimum wage ordinances should he 
strongly viable in the legislative states that have not expressly denied local governments  
the power to regulate wages — about half of the states.”128 
 Another social policy arena the literature touches on is obesity-related food and 
drink regulation. Illustratively, Diller and Graff set out to “to explain the legal authority 
of cities and counties to enact retail-food-related policies,” in part by “outlin[ing] leading 
approaches to determining municipal authority among the states.”129 In doing so, they 
assert that “With regard to…obesity-prevention proposals [involving the imposition of 
taxes or fees, the enactment of zoning regulations, and direct regulation of business 
operations], the first question a locality must ask is whether it has been given the 
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authority to regulate a given topic area” and prominently surmise that “Since 
municipalities in Dillon’s Rule states may exercise only expressly delegated zoning 
power…their ability to enact creative land use regulations to improve public health is 
likely to be more limited than that of home-rule municipalities.”130 Additionally, by way 
of a historical-legal analysis of the general characteristics of home rule-empowered local 
governments in the United States that is then utilized to filter through various policy 
options aimed at regulating the sale of obesity-conducive food and drinks, Steel 
determines that, in descending order of viability, “controls on business practices” 
utilizing functional autonomy, zoning regulations, and subsidies are all, generally 
speaking, legally sanctioned options open to local governments wishing to take action to  
fight obesity through regulatory measures.131 
Lastly, and least prevalently among the social issues brought to the fore in this 
body of literature, though still revelatory, is that of providing local government benefits 
to couples in same-sex domestic partnerships in which at least one partner is an employee 
of the locality. Gossett reviews a sample of 17 legal cases where such benefits were 
challenged on the specific grounds that it was not within the scope of the local 
government’s authority to provide said benefits; in doing so, he aims to discern “what 
happens when a local government’s authority to act in a new policy field is challenged in 
court as having violated the principles set forth in Dillon’s Rule.”132 13 of the cases in the 
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sample returned a final verdict sustaining the benefits programs,133 while only four ended 
in a rejection of the benefits programs,134 which, on the whole, appears to demonstrate 
that there is no substantial impact of Dillon’s Rule on these programs. However, in one of 
the four cases that resulted in the termination of locally enacted benefits programs, played 
out in Arlington County, Virginia, strict interpretation of home rule proved to be the 
lynchpin in the final decision of the state court system to nullify the program, which 
demonstrates that, while perhaps passive on this particular issue in the general, under the 
right circumstances, Dillon’s Rule can indeed be utilized in court to directly halt locally 
driven social change.135 
B. Questionable/Negligible Differences in System Impacts  
1. Local Service Delivery Quality– Differences in the efficiency and extent of local  
service delivery caused directly by the presence or absence of home rule appear virtually  
nonexistent.  
Studies within the sample that are devoted especially to assessing the efficiency of 
local service provision find that the direct impact of the presence or absence of local 
home rule is negligible. As a prime example, consider Tavares, Kassekert, Feiock, and 
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Kang’s multilevel analysis of the land use choices of Florida cities and counties.  
Utilizing responses from a survey of Floridian city and county planners conducted in 
2006 and a variety of economic and socio-demographic information compiled by the 
Census Bureau in the early 2000s, Tavares et al. assess, through hierarchical linear 
modeling, the accuracy of their original conceptualization of the political market 
framework for land use decisions as a means of “explain[ing] local growth management 
decisions within a multilevel setting by including institutional and political economy 
characteristics for cities and county unincorporated service areas and countywide 
institutional and contextual factors.”136 The dependent variable examined is one that 
directly concerns efficiency, “the amount of time between initial submission…and the 
issuance of final project approval,” which is of concern because “Lengthy processes can 
discourage developers’ investments and result in a barrier to development.”137  
Chiefly among the “institutional and contextual factors” included in the model is 
county home-rule status, which the scholars include in their model as “a binary variable 
for whether a county has a home rule charter government (1=Yes),”138 hypothesizing that 
home rule’s presence “will reduce approval time for permitting new development in cities 
and county areas” because “The degree of autonomy and discretionary authority allowed 
by home rule is considered a crucial element to overcome conflicts with the state over 
land use policies and set counties in a path of economic growth.”139 However, this 
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operative logic is not borne out in the modeling process whatsoever; Tavares et al. find 
that the presence or absence of home rule had a “highly insignificant” impact on approval 
time, from which “little can be inferred” apart from the fact that “The role of political 
institutions in explaining the variation in length of approval permit [sic] were 
minimal.”140 
Furthermore, studies such as Craw’s 2003 assessment of the intergovernmental 
and local influences that result in the provision or lack thereof of municipal social welfare 
programs in America cast considerable doubt on a frequent point of detraction directed 
toward Dillon’s Rule, which contends that the strong states in such state-local regimes 
tend to pass along social welfare responsibilities, sometimes in the form of unfunded 
mandates, to local governments. Craw prominently includes municipal autonomy as an 
independent variable in his social welfare provision model, which is measured for his 
analytical purposes by four separate dimensional scores (structural, functional, fiscal, and 
personnel management autonomy, respectively) based on a 1981 report and two 1993 
reports of the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations.141 With the use of a 
simple regression model, Craw assesses the various independent variables identified in 
his model for correlation with the dependent variable, social welfare provision, which is 
operationalized as a dummy variable “that is 1 if 1997 [municipal] spending on [public 
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welfare, health and hospitals, and housing and community development] is > 0, 0 
otherwise.”142  
Craw expects that “communities in states which grant less autonomy to local 
governments are likelier to provide social welfare services,” because under sufficiently 
great municipal autonomy, state governments are unable to “exploit local governments by 
passing on responsibilities to them.”143 Nonetheless, the findings of the regression 
analysis clearly demonstrate that “the extent to which states grant municipalities 
autonomy,” no matter how restrictive or broad-based, does not exert any significant 
impact on the fact of whether or not a community provides social welfare.”144 
2. Later-order Impacts on Nonpublic Systems - Ancillary effects of the degree of local 
government autonomy on the performance quality of partly or fully non-public systems 
also operating at the local level (economic development, healthcare, etc.) appear 
negligible at best. If anything, the proliferation of special purpose governments under 
home rule may be responsible for modest growth in employment.  
 It’s one thing to expect that the presence or absence of home rule will directly 
impact public service delivery; it’s still another to expect that these impacts will have 
ancillary impacts on other partly or fully nonpublic systems working at the local level. 
Many proponents of state-local decentralization maintain that home rule will have 
salubrious extra-system impacts, particularly in the realm of economic development, but 
the handful of comparative studies on such later-order impacts that are found in the 
literature sample provide hardly any empirical support for these claims. 
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 Beginning with a look into ancillary impacts on the healthcare system, Costich 
and Patton, in seeking “To understand law’s contribution to community health,”145 begin 
with the hypothesis that “the legal structure of public health, as expressed in the exercise 
of local fiscal and legislative authority, affects local population health outcomes.”146 To 
test said hypothesis, the scholars employ a cross-sectional research design, analyzing data 
from public health jurisdictions “with at least 100,000 residents (n=231)” assembled from 
a two-part series of surveys conducted in 1998 and again in 2006 with the same 
respondents; the dependent variable selected is the premature mortality rate, while four 
independent variables are selected, chiefly among them being the presence or absence of 
home rule.147 Though Costich and Patton “expected home rule to be associated with a 
decrease in premature mortality rates,” based on the operative logic that home rule 
“allow[s] local officials to respond to constituent needs and be held accountable,”148 they 
find that no matter whether it is measured as a dichotomous or a four-category variable, 
“Home rule had no statistically significant effect on premature death.”149 
 The literature sample’s findings are not quite as clear where economic 
development is concerned. Focusing “on the 30-year period from 1970 to 2000,”150 
Hammond and Tosun examine “the impact of local [fiscal] decentralization on long-run 
population, employment, and real per capita income growth” in American 
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counties,151operationalizing fiscal decentralization “in a multidimensional way,” “In 
general…interpret[ing] an increase in fragmentation as an increase in fiscal 
decentralization” and also including direct financial measures like “the ratio of county 
government revenue to total county and local government revenue.”152 Using a procedure 
“similar to cross-section growth regressions designed to provide results on convergence,” 
they find that “decentralization may contribute to metropolitan growth, particularly for 
employment and income growth” and that “fragmentation of special-purpose 
governments may spur employment growth for both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
counties, which may reflect the added institutional decentralization…”153 
 However, Schragger’s argument in “Decentralization and Development,” which 
presents a legal-historical account of the “status of cities vis-à-vis their states” in order to 
assess the credibility of some institutionalists’ claims that decentralization of political 
systems lends itself to economic development,154 flies in the face of Hammond and 
Tosun’s correlative findings regarding metropolitan economic growth by presenting 
evidence that the causation may very well be reversed: that changes in the state-local 
dynamic are perhaps fundamentally caused by economic development. Schragger traces 
his case back to the very establishment of Dillon’s Rule and home rule, both of which he 
claims as prime examples of how “institutional design follows economic development”: 
 The disempowerment of the cities happened in response to local economic and  
political behavior brought about by the newly wealthy or wealth-seeking 
municipalities. Those municipalities were providing many new services that cities 
had not provided before: sewer and water systems, roads, sanitation, ports, parks, 
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schools, electricity, streetcars, street lights, and public buildings… opening the 
way for local officials to engage in self-dealing and for transportation and utility 
interests to line their pockets… The home rule movement that followed was also a 
response to these circumstances… in reality these devices had the same purpose 
as Dillon's Rule: to constrain political officials [in this instance, in the state 
government] who were prone to exploiting urban wealth and resources.155 
 
It is a trend that Schragger argues has continued well into the 20th and 21st centuries, “ad 
hoc, improvised, and responsive to economic concerns,”156 that is even now reflected in 
in the fact that “the economic power of the suburbs is reflected in a certain form of state-
local relations, one that privileges suburban jurisdictions over urban ones.”157 For all 
these reasons, home rule-produced decentralization seems an unlikely candidate to be the 
progenitor of urban economic successes. 
C. Complicating Factors 
1. Impermanence of Home Rule - The legal capacity of substate governments is 
inherently transitory, especially where real or perceived local fiscal mismanagement 
occurs. 
Even where rigorously defined, state-to-local conferrals of discretion have limited 
staying power. As a prime example, consider Nickels’ side-by-side case studies of New 
Jersey and Michigan, which utilize “primary source data from each state, including legal 
text, judicial opinions, and court briefs” in order to assess home rule status’ relation to 
municipal takeovers undergone in each state.158  
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In New Jersey, sections of the state’s 1947 constitution (use of which has 
continued into the present day) and a couple of key legislative enactments, one in the 
1910s and another in the 1950s, work in tandem to place limits on the legislature that 
produce negative rights of protection from legislative interference for local 
governments.159 Yet, erosions of this negative right began the very same year the current 
constitution established home rule through the passage of an act that established a that the 
state government could still impose “special restraints upon municipalities in, or in 
danger of falling into, unsound financial condition…to forestall serious defaults upon 
local obligations and demoralize finances that burden local taxpayers and destroy the 
efficiency of local services”; in fact, restrictions technically predated the 1947 
constitution by 14 years, when the regulatory Municipal Finance Commission came into 
being.160 Other restrictions, primarily financial in nature, proliferated in the latter half of 
the 20th century, including requirements to report budgeting and bond issuance decision 
processes to the state and the imposition of a cap on annual increases in the budgets of 
local governments, while a series of cases in the state court system opened up an avenue 
for the operative logic that so long as a matter “involve[es] state policy or [is] in the 
realm of affairs of general public interest and applicability,” the state can intervene, as 
“there is no inherent right of local self-government beyond the control of the State.”161 
These antecedent conditions led to the creation of a “State Department of Community 
Affairs, which had the authority to oversee municipal finances, audit, intervene in local 
affairs and place distressed locales under the oversight of the Municipal Finance 
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Commission and/or a Local Finance Board” and a court ruling in a case questioning the 
power of a board-appointed city business manager that found, in part, that the “so-called 
‘Home Rule’ tradition in this State, strongly relied upon by the City, is not founded on 
our Constitution or any statutes pertinent to this circumstance.”162 These results, in turn, 
paved the way for the passage of the Municipal Rehabilitation and Economic Recovery 
Act in 2002, which was designed to force change in a then-distressed Camden, New 
Jersey by, among other things, installing a Chief Operating Officer for the city and 
developing a special authority “charged with oversight of the redevelopment process”163; 
originally introduced as the Camden Rehabilitation and Economic Recovery Act, the 
responsible legislators skirted around the last bit of home rule protections in his way by 
renaming the bill such that it was not unconstitutional as a law addressing a specific 
substate government.164  
 Experiences have been similar in Michigan, but on an accelerated timeline due to 
distresses faced in the Detroit area during the 1980s. Fittingly, as the state in which the 
Cooley Doctrine was espoused in 1871, Michigan has a fairly strong enshrined system of 
home rule.165 In addition to protections from legislative interference, the state constitution 
and subsequent legislative enactments have established a freedom for “local control over 
municipal charter” and, further still, have established that “legislative interventions that 
would affect a locale require electoral approval.”166 Yet, because home-rule status itself 
was not self-executing, the state legislature had to lay out a procedure for attaining it 
                                                
162 Ibid., 15-16. 
163 Ibid., 15, 17. 
164 Ibid., 15. 
165 Ibid., 18. 
166 Ibid., 19. 
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through the passage of the Home Rule City Act in 1909 – which included limitations on 
municipal powers and has been altered repeatedly since its passage to further restrict 
those powers, such that by the time the first salvo in the state’s municipal takeover efforts 
came to pass with the institution of the Emergency Municipal Loan Act in 1980 (again, 
an “inclusive” bill aimed at one local government), there was little standing in its way.167 
In fact, in the face of worsening municipal and county crises, the state’s takeover laws 
have concentrated more power in the hands of emergency managers to the detriment of  
local control.168 
 Based on the primary source evidence in each of these case studies, Nickels 
concludes that “the history of home rule authority as determined by the legislature and 
the courts, is particularly relevant in understanding…the legality of municipal takeover” 
and moreover, that due to the erosion of home rule status over time, “neither 
constitutional nor legislative home rule protects municipal governments” from state 
takeover, particularly when it is possible for those takeovers to be “veiled as fiscal 
policy.”169  
That municipal takeover policies, which, by definition, strip municipal 
governments of any and all disconnect with state authority, should find currency in two 
states with fairly well defined systems of home rule, one of which is no less than the 
home state of the author of the Cooley Doctrine, sends a powerful message about the 
delicate nature of local authority. Moreover, Nickels’ findings are corroborated by 
Schragger’s legal-historical argument. In “Decentralization and Development,” 
                                                
167 Ibid., 18, 20. 
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169 Ibid., 22-23. 
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Schragger proposes a testable conditional statement: “Institutionalists need a stable, self-
enforcing form of decentralization for the decentralization-growth thesis to obtain. If the 
political system cannot make credible commitments to preserving a decentralized system, 
then the institutional mechanism will collapse.”170 That conditional is subjected to 
historical analysis, which demonstrates separately that “Dillon's Rule was an effort to rein 
in local debt and spending initiatives”171; that “The home rule movement that followed 
was…a response to [this and other circumstances]”172; and that “The nature of the legal 
division of authority between states and localities has predictably followed [the] 
movement of people out of the cities” in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with 
home rule being “readily diluted by courts or openly flouted by legislatures” and “less of 
a bulwark against state intervention than a mechanism to restrict local power.”173 Thus, 
where institutionalist decentralization-for-growth theories require stable structures over 
time, Schragger argues, “we have the opposite—an oft-changing, arguably cyclical battle 
between political interests…that results in a grab bag of institutional constraints...”174 
2. Differing Impacts of Home Rule on Nonurban Areas – A dearth of the kind of 
concentrated interjurisdictional competition found among home rule governments in 
urban areas causes perverse home rule impacts in nonurban areas, marked by less 
responsiveness of local budgets to citizens’ demands for fiscal restraint and even 
correlation with bleak employment and population growth figures. 
                                                
170 Schragger, “Decentralization and Development,” 1865. 
171 Ibid., 1868. 
172 Ibid., 1869. 
173 Ibid., 1875. 
174 Ibid., 1865. 
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 On the whole, the contemporary body of literature that addresses the effects of 
state-local decentralization of power makes little effort to examine the experiences of 
nonurban areas – under home rule and under Dillon’s Rule both. Oftentimes, this lack of 
a nonurban area-inclusive focus is methodologically predetermined, such as in Costich 
and Patton’s analysis public health jurisdictions “with at least 100,000 residents 
(n=231)”175 and Gerber and Hawkins’ analysis of mayoral partisan impacts in the largest 
130 U.S. cities.176 And what’s more, the raw sample of local governments in home rule 
relationships is inherently skewed by the fact that many states’ home rule schemes assign 
greater autonomy to localities in highly populous areas. Although the selection and 
critical assessment portions of this review have ensured that all comparative studies in the 
literature sample that are both nationwide in scope or close to it and rely on fiscal data 
have a methodology that controls for population in one way or another, the fact that home 
rule is simply more often an urban phenomenon than a nonurban one still begs the 
question of whether or not nonurban areas experience different substantive impacts 
stemming from differences in the degree of state-local centralization of power. 
In the handful of studies within the literature sample that ask, ancillarily, if there 
is heterogeneity among home rule’s/Dillon’s Rule’s impacts based on the metropolitan or 
nonmetropolitan character of the area, which all have a fiscal focus, there is consensus in 
results: yes, nonmetropolitan areas are affected differently by state-local decentralization, 
and for the worse. As a prime example, consider Turnbull and Geon’s application of the 
median voter hypothesis to county expenditures, which found that county governments 
unrestrained by state-level restrictions such as home rule tend to “prevent local 
                                                
175 Costich and Patton, “Local Legal Infrastructure,” 1936. 
176 Gerber and Hawkins, “When Mayors Matter,” 331. 
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governments from unilaterally expanding activities beyond what their constituents most 
prefer,”177 save when the “horizontal (and vertical) competition effects of being in a 
metropolitan area” are present.178 One might infer, given these findings, that where the 
“effects of being in a metropolitan area” do not exist, there is much less restraint on the 
expansionary tendencies of relatively autonomous local governments, and that is 
precisely what Turnbull and Geon find: 
Home rule is a significant determinant of MVH violations for rural 
counties...While horizontal competition among governments in an urban area 
appear to effectively constrain the expansionary proclivities of the local leviathans 
for metropolitan counties, restrictions on home rule are needed to constrain rural 
counties from expanding activities beyond those most preferred by their 
constituents.179 
 
Similarly, Hammond and Tossun’s study, which finds that “decentralization may 
contribute to metropolitan [employment and income] growth”180 also finds disparate, 
negative impacts of decentralization for nonmetropolitan counties. In fact, Hammond and 
Tossun include a Chow test in their methodology with a null hypothesis that states, “all 
coefficients are the same across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties at the 1 
percent significance level”; their findings violate the null hypothesis, such that they feel 
compelled to report results for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties separately.181 
The nonmetropolitan results show “a significant negative coefficient on general-purpose 
governments per capita, which indicates that this form of local decentralization is 
                                                
177 Turnbull and Geon, “Median Voter,” 490. 
178 Ibid., 505. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Hammond and Tosun, “Decentralization on Economic Growth,” 62. 
181 Ibid., 56. 
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associated with slower nonmetropolitan population growth,”182 that “general-purpose 
government fragmentation negatively correlated with non- 
metropolitan [employment] growth,”183 and no nonmetropolitan correlation between 
decentralization and income growth.184 
                                                
182 Ibid., 58. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid., 60. 
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III. Summary of Findings 
Impact Area Home Rule vs. Dillon’s Rule 
Service Delivery ‚ Proliferation of special-purpose governments 
under home rule; comparatively fewer under 
Dillon’s Rule 
‚ Proliferation of general-purpose governments 
under home rule; comparatively fewer under 
Dillon’s Rule 
Finances ‚ Local governments under home rule exhibit 
greater sensitivity to urgent community needs 
‚ Where they have autonomy, local governments 
tend to be more responsive to voters’ 
electorally expressed desires for shifts in the 
focus of public expenditures 
‚ Dillon’s Rule local governments are less likely 
to exceed the total government expenditure 
desires of their citizens; home rule local 
governments are more likely to do so, and that 
tendency is even greater in nonmetropolitan 
areas than it is in metropolitan areas 
‚ Local governments under home rule acquire 
revenue from comparatively more sources; 
Dillon’s Rule local governments are 
particularly reliant on property taxes - and 
impose larger ones   
Legal Standing ‚ Greater capacity for local innovation on social 
policymaking under home rule systems than 
under Dillon’s Rule, although home rule 
localities’ heightened legal standing is 
ultimately tenuous, being highly dependent 
upon continued statewide support  
Late-Order Impacts on Partly and Fully Nonpublic 
Systems 
‚ Proliferation of special-purpose governments - 
typically a home rule phenomenon - tends to be 
associated with employment growth 
‚ Decentralization is associated with employment 
and income growth in metropolitan areas, 
although which way this causal chain runs is 
contested 
‚ In nonmetropolitan areas, fragmentation among 
general-purpose governments is associated with 
slower-than-otherwise population growth and is 
negatively correlated with employment growth 
Table 4-1  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Discussion 
 Clearly, the findings of this systematic review process do not avail either side of 
the debate over state-local power relationships in full. They do, however, challenge a 
significant portion of the traditional operative logic advanced by advocates for home rule. 
A tendency toward greater total expenditures than citizens find acceptable that is 
minimized only slightly by interjurisdictional competition, an associated proliferation of 
governing entities at the local level, and no empirically observed impacts on the 
timeliness of service delivery compared to the status quo are all discovered traits of home 
rule local governance that run directly counter to the argument that state-local 
decentralization through home rule is, always and everywhere, a public efficiency-
inducing undertaking. Likewise, links between home rule and salubrious economic 
effects are weak and largely conditional on the affected local jurisdictions being located 
in metropolitan areas.     
 However, at least two arguments in favor of home rule are also validated by this 
study. Investing more decision-making power in government units closest to the citizenry 
does, in fact, appear to make governing decisions more responsive to local voices. Be it 
an onslaught of local need brought on by natural disaster or a demand for a different 
focus for community expenditures expressed in the voting booth, wherever local 
governments have autonomy, they respond swiftly to such pressures through the 
allocation of their funds. Additionally, home rule does, demonstrably, give local 
governments more tools to solve both fiscal and social issues that come to the fore,  
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resulting in a more diverse body of revenues for localities and greater legal standing 
locally to tackle issues of economic justice and public health, among others. Dillon’s 
Rule governments, meanwhile, are heavily dependent upon a single source of revenue - 
the property tax - and are occasionally hindered from addressing important social 
problems that have presented themselves in the community by uncompromising state 
predominance under the law. 
 Thus, this systematic review’s results alter the conversation fundamentally, 
asserting that the question of home rule is not properly understood as one of efficiency, 
but as one of effectiveness in local representation. Whether such a system of state-local 
relations is palatable to a state populace or its leadership, in fact, would seem to hinge 
fundamentally on the question of how willing both groups are to trade local efficiency for 
local effectiveness - and ought to be dependent, as well, on how metropolitan the area 
impacted by the system is or would be. 
 As it happens, at least a partial logic for the observation that brought this study 
into being, the obstinacy of Alabama’s and Mississippi’s state-dominant power 
structures, can be constructed from the revelations made in this study. Both states, in 
addition to being primarily comprised of rural areas, are home to political climates that 
decidedly embrace (efficiency-philic) fiscal conservatism and (social innovation-wary) 
social conservatism, and as both Nickels and Schragger drive home, among others whose 
works were included in the literature sample, home rule cannot long survive in a political 
climate opposed to the effects of the freedom it confers. 
The decisive impact of political culture also demonstrates the validity and the 
value of institutionalism and, in particular, the IAD framework (see, again, Figures 2.2 
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and 2.3), which includes “community” along with “physical world” and “rules-in-use” as 
the three antecedent conditions of policy action. So, too, do the differences in home rule’s 
impacts on metropolitan and nonmetropolitan local governments, which can be attributed 
to antecedent communal and (to a lesser extent) physical contrasts between those 
localities. 
Several avenues of further research have asserted themselves in the execution of 
this systematic review. Chiefly among them, of course, is specifically exploring why and 
how nonmetropolitan governments are seemingly disadvantaged by the institution of 
state-local decentralization. It would also be of great service to state-local scholarship to 
analyze the impacts of a recently instituted home rule system, given the fact that many 
home rule states have had their current policies in this regard in place for decades, and as 
the literature sample makes clear, the direct impacts of home rule tend to fade over time. 
These two necessities for the advancement of public administration scholarship in this 
area have arguably converged with West Virginia’s recent introduction of home rule to a 
large group of its municipalities; as more data becomes available on the economic health 
of these municipalities and enables comparison among peer local governments in West 
Virginia and neighboring states, the time will be particularly ripe to conduct such studies. 
Additionally, public administration scholars would do well to keep an eye on the 
emerging body of state court cases regarding the competition between local ordinances 
banning hydraulic fracking and state preemption of those ordinances in home rule states. 
While several articles with this focus appeared in the literature search, most had to be 
excluded from the sample due to their prospective quality and generally high levels of 
uncertainty about what the future will hold. Ultimately, these court cases will, on the 
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whole, either confirm local legal capacity in environmental as well as social policy or 
serve as testament to the erosion of local power when state economic interests become 
tangibly affected by substate autonomy. 
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APPENDIX I: Databases Consulted in Addition to UM Library Sources 
 
·         Academic Search Premier 
·         Agricola 
·         America: History and Life 
·         American Fact Finder 
·         Annual Reviews 
·         Black Freedom Struggle in the 20th Century 
·         Business Source Complete 
·         Communication and Mass Media Complete 
·         Congressional Publications 
·         Congressional Universe 
·         CQ Researcher 
·         Data Planet 
·         Eighteenth Century Collections Online 
·         ERIC 
·         Ethnic NewsWatch 
·         GeoRef 
·         GreenFILE 
·         HAPI: Hispanic American Periodicals Index 
·         HeinOnline 
·         Homeland Security Digital Library 
·         Humanities International Complete 
·         Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 
·         JSTOR 
·         Latin American Intelligence Service 
·         LexisNexis Academic 
·         Making of Modern Law: Primary Sources, 1620–1926 
·         Mississippi Members of Congress 
·         NCJRS Abstracts 
·         Past Masters 
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·         Pennsylvania Gazette 
·         Political Science Complete 
·         Presidential Recordings Digital Edition 
·         PsycINFO 
·         Public Documents Masterfile 
·         Roper Center For Public Opinion Research 
·         Science.Gov 
·         Scopus 
·         Social Explorer 
·         SocINDEX with Full Text 
·         Statista 
·         Statistical Abstract of the United States 
·         Statistical Abstract of the World 
·         Statistical Datasets 
·         Statistical Insight 
·         U.S. Congressional Serial Set 
·         U.S. Serial Set and Maps Digital Collection 
·         WorldCat Local 
 
